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A B O U T  T H I S  R E P O R T 
Humanity is at a critical stage in the transition to  
a more sustainable planet and society. Our actions  
in the next decade will determine our collective future 
on earth. Making this planet a place where people  
can thrive in equity, prosperity, and peace is a task  
that falls to many hands.
Future Earth works to help build that common future. 
Formally established in 2015, Future Earth builds on 
more than three decades of global environmental 
change research that began with the International 
Geosphere-Biosphere Programme, Diversitas, and the 
International Human Dimensions Programme on Global 
Environmental Change. With offices in 20 countries 
and host to nearly 30 research-to-action networks, 
we collaborate with different societal groups to jointly 
develop knowledge that will accelerate transformations 
to global sustainability.
“Our Future on Earth” aims to tell the story of where 
we are on our collective journey by connecting the  
dots between what society is currently experiencing –  
from fires to food shortages to a rise in populism –  
with recent developments in the research community. 
Physical and social scientists have much to say about 
what is driving current events, and in this report  
science provides insight into how we might move  
in a more sustainable direction.
This inaugural report recounts how our future on earth 
is unfolding, while reminding us all that it is a future  
we are building together.
Amy Luers 
Executive Director, Future Earth
O U r  M O S T  U r G E n T 
T a S K  T O D aY  I S  T O 
P E r S U a D E  n aT I O n S  O F 
T H E  n E E D  T O  r E T U r n 
T O  M U LT I L aT E r a L I S M
F O r E W O r D
Our world stands at a crossroads. We face existential threats that demand urgent 
action, from the climate crisis to the risk of nuclear war. In 2020, we need to make  
a bold, collective, and positive choice to work together to secure our common future, 
and not retreat into tired dogma, failed policies, or defeatism.
As someone who has worked on sustainable development and social justice for  
many decades, I firmly believe that a collaborative and inclusive approach is essential. 
As Minister of Environment in Norway in the 1970s, I became engaged in pursuing  
a pattern of development that could benefit everyone, protect our planet, and promote 
peace. I continued this agenda as Prime Minister in the 1980s, while I also chaired  
the UN’s World Commission on Environment and Development.
I am glad to say that our 1987 report, “Our Common Future”, became a landmark 
document that brought sustainable development to the attention of Presidents,  
Prime Ministers and Finance Ministers. 
Today’s world is immeasurably different from that of the 1980s. The Cold War is over, 
millions of people have been lifted out of poverty, and the internet has transformed how 
we communicate, opening up new conversations and breaking down barriers. But at 
the same time, deadly pandemics can spread at lightning speed in our interconnected, 
globalized societies; likewise, the scourge of terrorism respects no borders and does 
not adhere to the “rules of war” as codified under the Geneva Conventions. 
The values and institutions of multilateralism are under attack, both from resurgent 
authoritarian rulers and cynical or weak politicians in established democracies.  
Faced with such a radical transformation of our economic and social paradigms, 
it is perhaps understandable that many people from everyday walks of life feel 
overwhelmed and seek solace in simplified narratives of a bygone “golden age”  
when they had a sense of being in control. What is profoundly irresponsible,  
however, is for politicians to collude in or deliberately stoke these illusions for their  
own aims of securing and sustaining power, in full knowledge that no one country, 
however powerful, will be able to meet these global challenges on its own.
The impressive array of articles in “Our Future on Earth” illustrates the extent of the 
challenge we face as global citizens, and also the inspiring and creative opportunities 
for transformational change, building on the activism of young people and those at the 
grassroots. When I look back at the words I wrote in the foreword of “Our Common 
Future” in 1987, I am struck by their continued relevance today:
“Our most urgent task today is to persuade nations of the need to return to 
multilateralism … the challenge of finding sustainable development paths ought to 
provide the impetus – indeed the imperative – for a renewed search for multilateral 
solutions and a restructured international economic system of co-operation.”
As we face the future in 2020, I hope we can draw on the lessons from the past  
to strive ceaselessly for a better, fairer, cleaner, and more peaceful world for all.
Gro Harlem Brundtland
Founding member of The Elders,  
Chair of the United Nations World Commission  
on Environment and Development (1983–1987)  
and former Prime Minister of Norway
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
CHarTInG  
THE FUTUrE
Gaia Vince
Science journalist, London, United Kingdom; 
author of Adventures in the Anthropocene 
(2014) and Transcendence (2019)
A network of fracking wells at the Oil and Gas Jonah field, Wyoming.
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India, Pakistan, and Australia – breaking temperature 
records and killing hundreds of people. Meanwhile, 
Arctic sea ice melted to its second lowest extent in the 
40-year satellite record, alongside alarming melting of 
Greenland’s ice sheet. A crippling drought coupled with 
poor infrastructure in Chennai, India – home to 10 million 
people – caused water shortages so severe that there 
were street clashes. Meanwhile, the heaviest monsoon  
in 25 years produced catastrophic floods across 13  
Indian states and the loss of at least 1,600 lives. In Kerala, 
over 100,000 people had to be evacuated. In September, 
Hurricane Lorenzo became the largest and most powerful 
hurricane to make it so far east in the Atlantic that it 
reached Ireland and the UK, just weeks after Category 5 
Hurricane Dorian devastated the Bahamas.
All of this has inspired action on a global scale, engaging 
young and old, rich and poor, escalating the pressure on 
governments and corporations. Thunberg’s school strikes 
have been carried out on Fridays in countries across  
the world, with some coordinated protests involving 
over 1 million children. Extinction Rebellion activists 
have closed streets and businesses globally in countries 
including the United Kingdom, the United States, and 
Australia, generally garnering public support for their cause 
despite the inconvenience. Meanwhile, in the United 
States, Democratic congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-
Cortez started the year introducing a proposed Green 
New Deal: legislation for drastic measures to cut carbon 
emissions across the economy, from electricity generation 
to transportation to agriculture. In the process, it aims to 
create jobs and boost the economy. Although it has stalled 
in the Senate, there remains public support for the idea.
“Green deals” have been proposed by several 
nations, and if passed into legislation they could prove 
transformative. Most are at an early stage and there  
is no guarantee of mainstream support. The future,  
as always, is uncertain.
The most reliable projections about our future are 
demographic: we can predict roughly how many people 
will be alive in 2050 (9.7 billion). Towards the end of 
the century, however, even predictions about numbers 
of people become hazier: estimates range from 9–12 
billion. Global population may well peak before 2100 and 
decline. We simply don’t know.2 It depends on a range  
of factors, such as the education of women and girls, 
which tends to reduce national reproduction rates. 
Crucially, it is not simply the number of people that 
is important, but where and how these people live. 
Currently, just a small, wealthy percentage of the  
global population is having by far the greatest influence  
on our planet.
Happily, the present is much more knowable and we 
have never had so many tools to help us. We can now 
see the changes we are making in real time, as we make 
them, from a planetary perspective: airborne surveys 
can spot the amount of photosynthesis in the Amazon, 
just as satellite images reveal the path of a churning 
hurricane as it approaches the islands of the Caribbean. 
Satellites chart the hourly change in temperature  
of the planet’s surface, while clues from ice cores  
and leaf waxes reveal details of past climates.
Science now provides an important view of our planet 
from the macro to micro scales and across deep time, 
giving us new insight into the Anthropocene. But how 
will this knowledge be harnessed and used? Will we use 
it to make our future more or less equitable? More or 
less wild?
Into the Anthropocene
We are not the first generation to change our environment. 
Ever since humans first emerged onto the wild savannah, 
we have modified our home – burning our way through 
forests, hunting to vanishment the biggest animals, 
cutting terraces of rice into mountains, shifting rivers,  
and digging rock and mud to build our cities. But the 
changes humans have made in recent decades have 
been on such a scale that they have altered our world 
beyond anything it has experienced in its 4.5 billion-year 
history. Our influence is so profound it is pushing the 
planet into a new age that geologists are calling the 
Anthropocene: the Age of Humans.
Millions of years from now, a stripe in the accumulated 
layers of rock on earth’s surface will reveal our human 
fingerprint just as we can see evidence of dinosaurs in 
rocks of the Jurassic, or the explosion of life that marks 
the Cambrian. Our influence will show up as changes 
in the chemistry of the oceans, the loss of forests and 
the growth of deserts, the damming of rivers, and the 
retreat of glaciers. The fossil records will show the 
It’s an interesting time for humanity: 
we are a vast global population facing 
unprecedented environmental challenges, 
yet we still have the time and the 
capability to prevent extreme outcomes, 
such as runaway climate change and 
wildlife extinctions. The future is in our 
hands – but, for now, unequally. Our ability 
to act and adapt depends on our position 
in society. The future needs to be not just 
more sustainable but also more resilient 
and more fair. 
This report provides  
a snapshot of our 
world at the start of 
2020, helping to make 
sense of the state of 
this unique biophysical-
human ecosystem we 
inhabit as a planetary-
changing species.  
It combines up-to-date 
research with the latest 
world events, including 
physical and social 
science perspectives  
to explore where we  
are now, where we 
hope to go, and how  
we might get there.  
It also includes a novel 
survey of scientists to 
rank their top concerns 
for global systemic risks 
in the coming years  
(see “Global Risks”).
Humans are now the 
main driver behind 
planetary change,  
and human systems 
must be targeted if  
we are to do something 
about it. That means 
addressing societal 
systems including 
populism, finance, and 
information transmission, alongside the practices  
and technologies that emit greenhouse gases,  
from fossil-fuel burning to food production.
This is a particularly exciting time to look at these issues: 
the past year has been one of extraordinary social 
awakening to the hazards of environmental change,  
and of demands for action towards a sustainable future. 
As 2019 unfolded, people began talking of “climate 
breakdown” and demanding their governments and 
institutions declare a “climate emergency” (Oxford 
Dictionaries chose “climate emergency” as its 2019 
word of the year). At the same time, there were calls  
for action on air pollution and single-use plastics.
Historians will surely argue over what spearheaded  
this sudden public engagement – outrage, even.  
There was no single factor, rather a combination  
of events, backed by more than three decades of work 
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC). It was perhaps heralded by the nonagenarian 
naturalist David Attenborough, in a powerful episode  
of the BBC’s Blue Planet II oceanic wildlife series in 
2017, which portrayed albatross parents feeding plastic 
to their chicks. This prompted more than 80% of viewers 
to make some change to their own behaviour, according 
to one survey,1 and is widely credited with general 
consumer demands for reducing plastics in packaging.
Towards the end of 2018, an IPCC Special Report spelled 
out the lesser impacts of heating the planet to 1.5°C  
above preindustrial levels 
versus 2°C, which  
was the target of the 
2015 Paris Agreement. 
The main takeaway  
from this report was  
that limiting warming  
to 1.5°C would be far 
better for ecosystems 
and communities, and 
this requires urgent  
and aggressive action  
to reduce carbon dioxide 
emissions and remove 
greenhouse gases  
from the atmosphere 
(see “Climate”).
Soon after that report’s 
publication, a grassroots 
organization called 
Extinction Rebellion 
blockaded five bridges 
across the River Thames 
in London, causing 
widespread disruption 
and huge media 
coverage, demanding 
government action on 
biodiversity loss and a 
reduction in greenhouse 
gas emissions to net  
zero by 2025. Then,  
just a few weeks later,  
at the December meeting 
of the United Nations Climate Change Conference in 
Poland, Greta Thunberg, a 15-year-old Swedish schoolgirl, 
delivered an extraordinarily blunt speech – more of a call 
to arms – to heads of state. Thunberg’s own journey had 
begun months earlier, with daily, solitary protests outside 
the Swedish Parliament, holding a sign calling for action  
on climate change.
This has occurred against a backdrop of extreme weather 
and ongoing warming. At the time of writing, 2019 was 
on track to be the second or third warmest year on 
record. In 2019, wildfires blazed across the northern 
hemisphere and Australia. Summer heatwaves produced 
temperatures above 45°C in Europe – above 50°C in 
H U M a n S  a r E  
n OW  T H E  M a I n 
D r IV E r  B E H I n D 
PLa n E Ta r Y  
C Han G E
Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez introduced 
legislation for drastic measures to cut carbon emissions across 
the US economy.
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extinctions of various animals (currently happening at 
1,000 times the historic rate3), the chemical fingerprint 
of materials like plastic carrier bags, and the physical 
footprint of projects like the oil sands mines of Alberta, 
Canada, which annually move twice as much earth than 
flows down all the rivers in the world in a given year.
In the Anthropocene, humanity has become a 
geophysical force on a par with the earth-shattering 
asteroids and planet-cloaking volcanoes that defined 
past eras. Earth is now a human planet. We are now the 
most numerous big animal on earth, and the next in line 
are the animals we have created through breeding in 
order to feed and serve us. Four-tenths of the planet’s 
land surface is used to grow our food. Three-quarters of 
the world’s fresh water is controlled by us. Some 75% 
of the globe's terrestrial ecology has been significantly 
modified by humans.4
In changing the earth we have been able to live longer 
and healthier, in greater numbers than ever before. 
There are now nearly 8 billion of us. A 72-year-old man 
today has the same chances of dying as a 30-year-old 
caveman.5 The chance of a child dying before the age  
of five has declined five-fold since 1950, and the number 
of women dying in childbirth has almost halved globally 
since 1990.6 The world is becoming a safer place for  
a human to live and grow up in, largely due to modern 
medicine and affordable, plentiful food.
We have improved the planet for our survival in a number 
of ways, but we have also made it worse: using up its 
resources, killing off its biodiversity, polluting it with 
waste, and straining its capacity to support us. Some of 
those negative consequences we can overcome through 
technological advances, migration, or other adaptations. 
Others we will need to reverse. Some others we will 
need to learn to live with.
Humans are no longer just another animal: we have 
specifically human rights that are expected to be achieved 
through development, including access to sanitation  
and electricity – even the internet. Delivering social  
justice and protecting the environment are closely linked.
In 2015, the UN member states all agreed 17 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for the year 
2030, as a universal plan to achieve a better future for 
all, recognizing that all of our needs are intertwined with 
each other’s and with our environment. The SDGs seek 
to address the global challenges we face, including those 
related to poverty, inequality, climate, environmental 
degradation, prosperity, and peace and justice. We are 
one-third of the way through the timeframe to 2030,  
and despite progress in a number of areas, on some 
of the goals progress has been too slow or has even 
reversed. For instance, even though extreme poverty  
has reached its lowest point since monitoring began,  
we are still not on track to end it by 2030.
Joined-up thinking
The environmental problems we face are systemic: 
a mixture of physical, chemical, biological, and social 
change that all interact and feed back on each other. 
Trying to understand how our impacts in one area, 
such as river extraction, affect another, such as food 
provision, is a complex task. But that’s what scientists, 
sociologists, economists, ecologists, and others are 
trying to do. And while our problematic practices in one 
area can impact many other areas, the good news is that 
so can our restorative ones: improving biodiversity in 
a wetland ecosystem can also reduce water pollution  
and soil erosion, and protect crops against storm damage, 
for instance. We are making our own Anthropocene  
and we can make it a good one.
The chapters that follow help to define our current state 
and identify the challenges we face in achieving a good 
Anthropocene. Crucially, they also suggest ways of 
improving our future prospects to create a sustainable 
society living within our environmental limits. By 
necessity these chapters are shaped by the authors’ 
opinions, based on their own expertise and peer-reviewed 
research; other views of the future exist, of course,  
and together should help to stimulate further discussion.
As a species, our operations on the planet are organized 
through political structures, and the recent rise in 
the politics of populism is one concern identified 
by the authors in the chapters that follow. Populism 
is characterized by a denial of complexity, including 
the complexity of environmental damage and the 
systemic, multi-layered interactions required to achieve 
sustainability. Nevertheless, grassroots organizations, 
activists, and indigenous groups are beginning to join 
the dots between social justice and environmental 
protection. This is proving to be a powerful movement 
(see “Politics”).
Another important trend is the increasing financial risk 
of climate and environmental change – now named 
by insurers as the top risk for their industry. The first 
climate-change-related bankruptcy occurred in 2019, 
when California’s largest electric utility company,  
PG&E, went under after sparking a huge forest fire. 
In the Anthropocene, the risk of natural disasters, 
extreme weather, and related human costs will increase, 
raising the price for insurance, resources, and other 
commodities. But our financial systems also have the 
potential to expedite our transition to sustainability. 
Green, socially responsible investments, loans,  
T H E  P a S T  Y E a r  H a S  B E E n 
O n E  O F  E X T r a O r D I n a r Y 
S O C I a L  a W a K E n I n G 
T O  T H E  H a Z a r D S  O F 
E n V I r O n M E n T a L  C H a n G E
Great Acceleration
Humanity’s climbing influence on the planet can be seen across biogeophysical and social measures. 
Source: Adapted from Steffen, W. et al. 2015. The Anthropocene Review, 2(1), 81–89. https://doi.org/10.1177/2053019614564785 
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Earth System Trends
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and bonds are growing, helping to fund renewable 
energy projects for example. Green loans may even  
be less risky than traditional loans, because they are 
more resilient (see “Finance”).
Bolstering financial resilience must go hand in hand with 
increasing the resilience of our communities. Into the 
Anthropocene, people will need to adapt to changing 
and inhospitable conditions – extreme weather, coastal 
erosion, sea-level rise, depleted soils, heatwaves,  
and so on. Migration will continue to be an important 
survival adaptation, with the potential to improve lives  
and livelihoods for migrant and host communities alike. 
But impediments to migration can lead to increased 
human misery and loss of life. Much of this might 
be avoided with pragmatic planning that anticipates 
inevitable demographic change, and accommodates 
human movements with infrastructure and targeted  
social inclusion programmes (see “Forced Migration”).
Changes to where and how our global population  
lives are also having a massive impact on landscapes, 
nearly half of which are used to produce our food.  
Today, malnutrition rates are creeping upwards again 
for the first time in years, even as the amount of food 
produced per capita increases. As our population 
increases and a greater proportion desires meat diets, 
we will need to produce more food from increasingly 
degraded soils, in a less reliable climate, with ever 
more freshwater shortages. About one-third of food is 
wasted: in poor nations, this is often because of lack of 
refrigeration, poor roads, and other infrastructure issues; 
in rich nations, the waste happens after purchase, 
by supermarkets, householders, and food outlets. 
This represents significant opportunities to improve 
efficiencies. At the same time, improvements in 
irrigation, agricultural technologies, and a societal  
move towards reducing meat and dairy consumption 
offer hope for a more sustainable future (see “Food”).
The media plays an important role in how information is 
reported and contextualized, in holding powerful interests 
to account, and in amplifying the voices of marginalized 
communities. In 2019, we have seen a continuation 
of the spread of fake news, often funded by those 
with a vested interest in preventing social justice and 
environmental legislation. On the other hand, we have 
also seen the beginnings of a fightback by fact-checking 
groups, including Full Fact in the United Kingdom. 
Following fake news scandals that influenced elections 
in the United States, Kenya, and Europe, social media 
barons may also be held to account – there are signs  
that Facebook may face tighter regulation (see “Media”).
Despite these problems, digital media remains a  
vital part of the communication and collaboration tool 
that enables people from around the world to transmit 
knowledge, share ideas, and find solutions to our social 
and environmental problems. Digitization of other 
systems could improve sustainability. For instance, 
digital monitoring of resource use, such as water  
and fertilizer in agricultural production, could lead  
to greater efficiencies and help to change behaviours  
(see “Digitial Innovation”).
Unusually, there is no IPCC climate report being 
published in 2020 (although scientists are preparing 
major reports and international meetings in 2021 and 
2022). It will, however, be an important year for the 
ocean, with the first international treaty being hashed  
out to protect earth’s last wilderness, the high seas,  
from overfishing, deep-sea mining, and other threats  
(see “Ocean”). And the Convention on Biological 
Diversity will meet in Beijing in 2020 to negotiate  
a New Deal for Nature. In part this is an attempt to 
extend the agreement reached in 2010 to halt biodiversity 
loss by 2020, which has manifestly failed despite  
a few individual success stories (see “Biodiversity”). 
Perhaps the biggest policy decider, however, will be  
the US presidential election this year, which, apart 
from its role on the international stage, will set national 
funding for environmental and social projects, legislation, 
research, investment, and the nation’s commitment  
to achieving sustainable Anthropocene conditions.
There is reason to be hopeful: there have never been 
as many areas of land and sea under some sort of 
conservation protection – the tiny Pacific island nation 
of Palau is to close off 80% of its marine area (an area 
larger than California) to commercial fishing and mining, 
to create a marine sanctuary for its 1,300 species of fish 
and 700 types of coral, for instance. There has also been 
a growth in urban farming and architectural ecosystems 
– city planners are increasingly greening artificial spaces 
with parks and gardens, creating novel ecosystems that 
encourage urbanites to get closer to nature.
The changes we need to make are huge; transformational. 
We need entirely new ideas about how to incentivize 
businesses, measure progress, value diversity, and 
acknowledge the importance of social equity. Such 
transformations are possible – they have happened 
before and must happen again (see “Transformation”). 
But even such major reformations of how society 
functions consist of the individual agency of voters, 
consumers, gardeners, parents, and witnesses.
In 2020, we can no longer claim we are unaware of 
environmental change – it is depicted everywhere across 
our media. Every day, our small and large choices ripple 
across society and are multiplied and added into the 
greater wave. Even if some environmental changes feel 
too locked-in or overwhelming to reverse, we have the 
power to change the social justice systems that underlie 
and manage their impacts on us. We live in our own  
small local environments that we can ourselves defile, 
restore, or enhance. Each is a part of the bigger whole, 
just as we are part of a bigger humanity.
A offshore oil rig during sunset, Australia.
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A survey by Future Earth of more than  
200 scientists has revealed five global 
risks that have the potential to impact and 
amplify one another, in ways that might 
cascade to create global systemic crisis: 
failure of climate change mitigation  
and adaptation; extreme weather events; 
major biodiversity loss and ecosystem 
collapse; food crises; and water crises.
These are issues that already consume huge amounts 
of press and academic attention – they are highlighted, 
too, in some of the chapters of this report (see “Climate”, 
“Biodiversity”, and “Food”). But the emphasis of the 
survey results is that it is the interplay between these 
five risks that is most concerning. 
Various subsets of these risks also turned up as key  
issues across the various questions posed to scientists  
in our survey. Four of the five – climate change,  
extreme weather, biodiversity loss, and water crises – 
were perceived as the most likely and most impactful risks 
currently facing humanity. Two of them – climate change 
and biodiversity loss – were also the ones or which society 
seems to be currently locking in undesirable futures.
As the scientific advisors for this survey, we call on the 
world’s academics, business leaders, and policymakers  
to pay urgent attention to these five global risks, and  
to ensure that they are treated as interacting systems, 
rather than addressed one at a time, in isolation. 
Appreciating their potential integration and interaction 
is critical for addressing the human and planetary 
challenges that lie ahead.
A web of risks
The new survey complements and expands other efforts 
to assess the likelihood and importance of various risks 
facing humanity and the planet. The World Economic 
Forum (WEF), for example, has been conducting a 
Global Risks Perception Survey since 2006 that targets 
decision makers across business, policy, academia, 
and civil society. Its 2019 Global Risks Report compiled 
answers from nearly 1,000 decision makers, who 
identified extreme weather and failure of climate-change 
mitigation and adaptation as the gravest threats over  
the coming ten-year horizon.1
In 2019, Future Earth undertook a survey of global 
change scientists’ perception of risks. The participation 
of scientists both within and outside the Future Earth 
community was solicited using various social media 
outlets, email lists, and word of mouth. As a starting 
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point the survey draws from the list of WEF top 30 
global risks. Participants were asked to identify groups  
of risks most likely to have synergistic effects that could 
lead to a global systemic crisis; to share their perception  
of the likelihood and impact of these global risks;  
and to identify other emergent global risks. 
In the end, responses from 222 scientists from 52 
different countries were analysed (where “scientists” 
were defined as respondents having at least a master’s 
degree and more than one year of experience in a 
scientific field). The “Future Earth Risk Report 2020” 
including the full survey methodology and results, is 
published concurrently with this report and can be found  
at https://futureearth.org/initiatives/other-initiatives/grp.
Not every respondent answered every question. When 
asked to identify clusters of global risks from among the 
list of risks that are most likely to have synergistic effects 
and possibly lead to a global systemic crisis, 82 scientists 
replied. A network map of those responses reveals how 
all assessed risks are embedded in a complex web of 
interdependencies, with a clear top five (See Figure: 
Interconnected Risks). An event in any one of these 
dimensions could potentially trigger events in connected 
realms, multiplying the likelihood and impact of risks.
The potential for crises arising from interactions is  
well known; society has seen many crises coming  
from sometimes-unexpected cascading impacts  
across systems. In China, sleet and snowstorms of 
2008 led to massive failures in the power grid across 
19 provinces that interrupted basic transport; this 
stranded 6.5 million people, and disrupted distribution 
of basic goods including food and coal, leading to food 
price hikes and the shutdown of coal plants, further 
exacerbating the power crises.2 The introduction of 
Arctic foxes onto remote Aleutian Islands by Russian  
fur trappers in the 1940s decimated seabird  
populations, whose guano provided the primary  
source of nutrient to the ecosystem, causing the  
islands to shift from a productive grassland to an 
impoverished tundra ecosystem.3
There are also well-known connections between  
the top five identified risks. Many extreme weather 
events have been clearly attributed to climate change, 
and climate change is making such events more  
frequent and intense.4 In some cases, extreme weather 
events exacerbate climate change by triggering the 
release of carbon stored in terrestrial ecosystems.5 
Extreme weather events such as heatwaves or  
droughts impact crop production and water availability:  
for example, after the 2012 heatwave in the United States, 
maize yields dropped by 13%.6 Changing rainfall patterns 
predicted by many climate change scenarios are expected 
to make food and water crises more frequent and more 
severe.7 Importantly, biodiversity can help buffer these 
effects: more-diverse grass and cropping systems 
are more productive than less-diverse systems when 
put under stress of climate extremes.8,9 We are only 
beginning to piece together the ways these different 
systems interact, and other, unknown or unanticipated, 
interactions are also likely.
Despite this ubiquity of connections, many scientists 
and policymakers are embedded in institutions that 
are used to thinking and acting on isolated risks, one 
at a time. This needs to change to thinking about risks 
as connected.10 Global agreements such as the United 
Nations conventions on climate change (UNFCCC), 
biological diversity (UNCBD), and desertification (UNCCD), 
among others, must work together to ensure that  
cross-cutting and interacting risks are considered  
as a system.
On the horizon
Four of the five top interconnected risks were also 
identified by survey participants as the most likely to 
occur, with the most significant impacts, and with a solid 
scientific understanding underlying those assessments. 
Collectively, our 221 survey respondents with complete 
answers perceived the likelihood and impact to be 
strongest for a group of four environmental and social 
risks – extreme weather, climate change, biodiversity 
loss, and water crises (See Figure: Likelihood and 
Impact). These were each ranked as having a solid 
base of science underpinning their assessments. 
Interestingly, similar patterns emerged in the WEF 
report, which had extreme weather and climate change 
topping its list.
We also asked participants to identify risks for which 
they believe society may be committing to in the next 
decade with potentially catastrophic outcomes, or for 
which we may pass a threshold that will trigger longer-
term catastrophic effects. In other words, we asked 
which risks have impacts which we may already be 
“locking in”. Respondents provided their own answers 
here, rather than selecting from the list of 30 global risks. 
Out of the 69 responses, the most common answers 
were overwhelmingly focused on biodiversity loss and 
ecosystem collapse, and climate change.
Finally, we asked survey respondents if they considered 
that there were additional risks, not on our list, that 
should receive greater attention from the global 
community. A number of themes emerged from their 
173 responses, including: the erosion of societal trust 
and values; deterioration of social infrastructure; rising 
inequality; a rise in political nationalism; overpopulation; 
and a decline in mental health. Interestingly, the majority 
of these touch on issues of societal well-being and social 
security, suggesting that societal risks may be growing 
and in need of greater consideration. This is especially 
pertinent as we consider how society can transition to 
a climate-safe and equitable future in light of climate 
change and extreme weather being identified as the top 
risks in the current survey. Perhaps the most interesting 
theme to emerge from these responses was the failure 
to take into account feedback across different systems.
Many respondents provided narrative descriptions of 
compounding effects across environmental, societal, 
economic, technological, and geopolitical systems.  
As one respondent noted, “While extreme climate events 
are weakening the societal governance and infrastructure, 
food and water security will become more and more 
serious, causing large-scale immigration and further 
inequity. If several geopolitical crises occur in parallel, 
many states cannot handle the situation properly,  
due to lack of resources and with the internal conflict,  
it would cause catastrophic outcomes all over the world.”
Given this repeated emphasis on the interconnectedness 
of risks, along with scientists’ identification of the top five 
interconnected risks for global systemic crises, we urge 
that this nexus be ever more on the radar of decision 
makers and policymakers.
In order to avoid these threats and mobilize collective 
action, it will be imperative to engage different 
communities in dialogues on global risks and create 
a shared sense of risk. To this end, Future Earth will 
continue to administer the Global Risks Scientists’ 
Perception survey annually, to foster a meaningful 
discussion with decision makers, business leaders,  
and civil society, and to develop paths to ambitious  
yet feasible collective action.
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These five risks, or a subset of  
them, showed up repeatedly across 
the different questions of this survey
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Extinction rebellion protester in Neuchâtel, 
Switzerland, September 2019.
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In the summer of 2019, just after thousands 
of schoolchildren had taken to the streets 
to protest lack of action on climate change, 
the northern hemisphere was gripped by 
heatwaves. In the United States, Alaska 
saw record-breaking temperatures of  
more than 30°C, a full 10°C above normal.  
At the end of July, the Japanese government 
reported that 11 people had died and more 
than 5,000 were sent to hospital in a 
single week from heat. Across Europe and 
India, unprecedented heatwaves brought 
temperatures higher than a scorching 45°C.
Conditions like these are now being called the  
“new normal” by scientists and media, along with  
the associated increased risk of wildfire, heat death, 
water shortages, and power outages. The World Weather 
Attribution project, which aims to rapidly assess climate 
change’s contribution to 
such extreme events, 
determined that every 
heatwave seen in 
Europe in 2019 had been 
made “more likely and 
more intense by human-
induced climate change”; 
France’s extreme 
June temperatures 
were determined to 
happen ten times more 
frequently today than a 
century ago.
The warming is global. 
In the Arctic, the last 
five years have been 
the warmest on record, 
and a combination of 
warming temperatures, 
sea-ice decline, and 
permafrost melting is 
triggering a cascade of 
impacts on wildlife, fisheries,  
and local communities much sooner than anticipated.  
In Greenland, a heatwave caused unprecedented 
ice-sheet melt of almost 200 billion tons in July 2019, 
enough to raise sea level by 0.5 mm.1 In the oceans, 
marine heatwaves have doubled in frequency since  
1982 and are now more intense.2
Over the last 18 months, major assessments by 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), the US National Climate Assessment, and the 
Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity 
and Ecosystem Services (IPBES), have all argued that 
time is running out to reduce the greenhouse gas 
emissions that are causing the climate to warm.  
This has inspired declarations of a climate crisis or 
climate emergency by the leaders of more than 700 
cities, states, and governments, including the Scottish, 
Irish, Portuguese, French, and Canadian governments, 
Sydney City Council in Australia, the Cities of Milan  
and Naples in Italy, the cities of New York and San 
Francisco in the United States, and a global network  
of 7,000 universities.
Humanity’s response to this crisis, including the 2015 
United Nations (UN) Paris Agreement, has not yet 
been sufficient to halt climate change. During 2019, 
the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere 
reached more than 415 ppm, and the five years from 
2014–2018 were the warmest recorded over land and 
ocean since 1880.3 Ice core records suggest that CO2  
has not been this high, nor risen so fast, in at least 
800,000 years, and today’s temperature is likely the 
warmest in 100,000 years.
While the amount of energy produced from carbon-
intensive coal is declining, and energy from renewables 
is on the rise, these factors have not yet changed the 
trajectory of global emissions.4 The Global Carbon 
Project estimates global emissions from CO2 at 37 
Gigatons (Gt) for 2018. That’s an increase of 2.1% over 
2017 after several years 
of slower growth.5 
While some analysts 
are optimistic about 
the falling cost of 
renewables and the 
growth of the electric 
vehicle market, they 
also note that use of 
fossil fuels, especially 
gas, is still growing in 
many national energy 
portfolios, and nuclear 
energy faces barriers 
to expansion in many 
countries. The global 
fossil fuel market  
shows few signs of 
the reversal and rapid 
decline needed to  
slow or stabilize  
global warming.
In the face of all this, 
youth and other civil society groups across the world 
are demanding urgent action on climate change.
Students have gone on school strikes and marches in 
more than 70 countries demanding action on climate 
change and have sued their governments for the right 
to a clean environment. Greta Thunberg, a Swedish 
teenager who took Fridays off school to protest outside 
the Swedish parliament, became a spokesperson for 
the youth climate movement, addressing UN climate 
summits, the World Economic Forum, and the European 
Parliament. New social movements arose to protest 
climate breakdown, including the Sunrise Movement  
in the US which advocates for political action on climate 
change including a Green New Deal; and Extinction 
Rebellion in the UK, which asks governments to declare 
a climate emergency and reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions to net zero by 2025.
Greta Thunberg at the climate strike protest  
in Montreal in September 2019.
Contiguous US
A ‘bomb cyclone’ formed 
off the Pacific Coast  
on November 26,  
which brought heavy  
snow, hurricane-force 
winds, and rain to parts  
of the West. 
Caribbean region
November 2019 was 
the Caribbean’s second 
warmest November  
on record, behind 2015.
Africa
Africa had its warmest 
November on record. 
Australia
Dry and warm conditions 
continued to affect Australia 
during November 2019.  
This was Australia’s 
driest and 10th warmest 
November on record. 
Bushfires consumed an 
unusually large area in 
November and December. 
Cyclone Kyarr  
(October 24–31, 2019)
Maximum winds: 240km/h 
Kyarr was the first super 
cyclone in the Arabian  
Sea since Cyclone Gonu  
in June 2007. 
Cyclone Bulbul
(November 5–11, 2019)
Maximum winds:155km/h  
Bulbul was over 
Bangladesh for about 
36 hours, becoming the 
longest enduring cyclone 
Bangladesh has faced  
in over 50 years. 
New Zealand
New Zealand had  
its highest November 
temperature on record.
South America
South America had its 
warmest November 
temperature departure 
from average on record.
Antarctic sea ice extent
November 2019 sea ice 
extent was 6.35 percent 
below the 1981-2010 
average-the second 
smallest November sea ice 
extent on record behind 
November 2016. 
Arctic sea ice extent
November 2019 sea ice 
extent was 12.80 percent 
below the 1981–2010 
average – the second 
smallest November sea 
ice extent since satellite 
records began in 1979. 
Only November 2016  
was smaller.
Europe
Europe had its third 
warmest October  
on record.
Asia
As a whole, Asia had 
its fourth warmest 
October on record.
Typhoon Hagibis  
(October 4–20, 2019)
Maximum winds: 260km/h
Typhoon Hagibis was 
one of the most rapidly 
intensifying tropical 
cyclones on record in the 
region. Hagibis brought 
record-breaking rainfall 
and caused widespread 
damage to parts of Japan. 
Weird Weather
Some significant climate anomalies and weather events from 2019.
Source: Adapted from NOAA, 2019
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The current Paris pledges and other policies,  
if implemented, would still result in global greenhouse  
gas emissions of 52–59 Gt by 2050 and a warming of 
2.7–3.5°C: less than business as usual, but far higher than 
any pathway that would limit warming to less than 2°C.
The difference in impacts between 1.5–2°C are 
significant. At 2°C, the planet loses 99% of tropical  
coral reefs; at 1.5°C, about 10–30% of these reefs  
are projected to survive. Fishery losses could double 
from 1.5–2°C. Both levels of warming are expected  
to cause serious impacts on marine biodiversity,  
ocean acidification, and the livelihoods and economies  
of coastal-dependent communities such as those in 
South East Asia, the Caribbean, and the Pacific islands.
Limiting warming to 1.5°C rather than 2°C reduces 
the number of people exposed to climate risks and 
susceptible to poverty by several hundred million by 
2050. Crop yield declines are much greater at 2°C,  
and the population exposed to heat and water stress  
is 50% higher at 2°C than 1.5°C. In Africa, the number 
of people at risk of hunger drops from 55 million to  
43 million if we can limit warming to 1.5°C. In the  
Global South, 420 million fewer people would be 
exposed to heatwaves by limiting warming to 1.5°C.
The greater the warming, the greater the anticipated 
impacts of heatwaves in cities, mainly in places of  
high urbanization rates, poverty, and marginalization  
in South East Asia and Latin America. In urban centres, 
such as the megacities of Mumbai or Jakarta,  
each degree of warming is expected to further reduce 
productivity for people working outdoors or without air 
conditioning. A warmer world has higher risks of flooding, 
landslides, fire, and infectious and parasitic disease  
(see box “Health hazards” ).
It is clear that every bit of warming matters, especially for 
the most vulnerable people and places. And the costs  
of adapting our world to 2°C will be higher than the costs 
of adapting to 1.5°C.
The Special Report on 1.5°C
In October 2018, the IPCC released its special report on 
“Global Warming of 1.5°C”.6 This provides an important 
and focused benchmark on the state of the climate,  
and an assessment of current efforts to limit global 
warming. The report received widespread public and 
media attention, and its findings continue to inform 
policy discussions across the world.
The 1.5°C report was unanimously approved by all 
countries at the intergovernmental plenary in Incheon, 
Korea, although some pro-fossil-fuel countries tried 
to undermine it at a subsequent meeting of the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
As indicated by its name, this report has a particular 
focus on the impacts of a global warming of 1.5°C, 
especially as compared with the UN’s target of limiting 
warming to 2°C. It examines the pathways and options 
that might limit warming to 1.5°C and how response 
options might interact with sustainable development.
The IPCC report finds that human activities have already 
caused 1°C of global warming above pre-industrial 
levels, with global mean temperature estimated  
to reach 1.5°C before 2050 if current trends continue.  
The warming so far is higher over land than over the 
ocean and is up to three times higher in the Arctic.  
In the past, warming of 1–2°C has dramatically shifted 
ecosystems and increased sea levels by several metres 
over millennia. Today, warming has already resulted in 
significant impacts on natural and human systems such 
as coral reefs, ice cover, water resources, and health – 
and these impacts are expected to increase as the  
world warms further.
Although many countries have pledged to reduce their 
emissions under the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change Paris Agreement, the promised cuts  
are not enough to limit longer-term warming to 2°C,  
let alone 1.5°C.
Without the Paris pledges, overall emissions (CO2, 
methane, and other greenhouse gases) are projected  
to increase from about 51 Gt of CO2 equivalents in 2015 
to 74–110 Gt by 2050. This would produce a warming  
of more than 4°C by 2100.7
T H E  P r O M I S E D  C U T S  a r E  
n O T  E n O U G H  T O  L I M I T 
L O n G E r -T E r M  Wa r M I n G  
T O  2°C ,  L E T  a L O n E  1 .5°C
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Mitigating and adapting to climate risk
The IPCC report suggests that for a good chance to 
limit warming to 1.5°C, global net anthropogenic CO2 
emissions need to decline by about 45% between 2010–
2030 with similar deep reductions in other greenhouse 
gases. Given that we are already approaching 2020 and, 
so far, emissions are continuing to increase, this decline 
will need to be even steeper to meet the 2030 goal.
Net-zero emissions are needed by 2050. This means that 
whatever emissions are produced by human activity must 
be balanced by the removal of greenhouse gases by natural 
systems (like plants) or negative emission technologies 
(like bioenergy or capturing and storing carbon).
These emissions figures and projections are global 
averages. The IPCC 1.5°C report did not address who 
should be most responsible for making emissions cuts. 
Because CO2 remains in the atmosphere for decades, 
some scholars, organizations, and governments believe 
that those with the greatest historical responsibility for 
emissions should make the greatest cuts – they point  
to Europe and North America as the most responsible, 
and suggest they should be seeking net-neutral 
emissions within the next few years.8
Are these cuts possible? The IPCC concludes that 
limiting warming to 1.5°C will require “rapid and 
far-reaching transitions in energy, land, urban and 
infrastructure (including transport and buildings), and 
industrial systems”, and that “these systems transitions 
are unprecedented in terms of scale, but not necessarily 
in terms of speed, and imply deep emissions reductions 
in all sectors, a wide portfolio of mitigation options and  
a significant upscaling of investments in those options”.
The 1.5°C pathways require a comprehensive portfolio  
of mitigation actions by 2030 including enhanced  
energy efficiency, reduced energy demand, steep 
decreases in the use of fossil fuels, increased use  
of renewables like solar, wind, hydro, nuclear,  
and bioenergy, and implementation of more ways  
to help the land soak up more carbon.
Given that some regions have already warmed more 
than 1°C, adaptation has already become an imperative  
in many places and sectors, and will be needed even  
if we are able to limit global average warming to 1.5°C.
The IPCC report assesses adaptation options that include 
constructing coastal barriers or planting mangroves  
to reduce the impacts of storms and sea-level rise;  
more efficient irrigation and water harvesting to conserve 
water; and designing buildings and planting trees to 
reduce urban temperatures. Adaptation options will vary 
from place to place: developing regions may focus more 
on health- and agriculture-related adaptation, for example, 
whereas in cities the focus may be on water and energy 
adaptation measures.
The UN Environment Programme’s December 
“Adaptation Gap Report 2018”9 notes that although 
many countries are starting to plan for adaptation, 
implementation is slow and finances are inadequate. 
The costs of adaptation, not even including the costs of 
protecting ecosystems, are estimated at up to US$300 
billion a year by 2030, and US$500 billion a year by 2050. 
Currently pledged finance is less than US$25 billion.
Climate change and sustainable development
The IPCC’s 1.5°C report was the first major IPCC 
assessment to be conducted since the adoption of the 
United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
in 2015. The Millennium Development Goals, set in 
2000, spurred success in reducing poverty and hunger, 
and providing drinking water between the 1990 baseline 
and 2015. Climate change now stands as a threat  
that could undermine those advances and the SDGs, 
making it harder, for example, to reduce poverty and 
hunger or to protect health and ecosystems.
The number of reported Lyme disease 
cases in Canada more than doubled from 
2009 to 2012, in part from the ticks that 
carry this disease spreading into warming 
regions. In the Baltic Sea, cases of illness 
from vibrios – bacteria that causes several 
illnesses – have been increasing with 
warmer sea surface temperatures.
There is limited monitoring of how climate 
change affects human health. Importantly, 
the magnitude and pattern of illnesses, 
injuries, and deaths depend not just 
on weather but also on public health 
preparedness, such as whether there 
are enough vaccines to tackle infectious 
diseases or a healthcare infrastructure 
resilient to the impact of floods. 
So far, there is no equivalent of the World 
Weather Attribution initiative for the health 
sector. But there are some cases where 
climate change was determined to be 
a cause of disease or death – including 
heat-related mortality, Lyme disease, and 
vibrios.12 And as heatwaves have become 
more frequent and warmer, heat stress, 
hospitalizations, and deaths are projected  
to increase.
A continually warming world is expected 
to have mostly negative consequences for 
human health and well-being.13 Increasing 
temperatures and heatwaves affect 
vulnerable populations such as older adults, 
children, and people with chronic diseases. 
Without additional preparation, increases in 
extreme weather events, such as flooding 
and drought, are projected to cause 
additional suffering.
Diseases carried by mosquitoes, such as 
malaria and dengue, are expected to spread 
to new areas – although these diseases 
may decline in other regions that become 
too hot and dry for the mosquitoes.  
Warmer temperatures can increase  
the concentrations of ground-level  
ozone, exacerbating respiratory illnesses. 
And the stress of extreme weather and 
climate events can lead to post-traumatic 
stress disorder, anxiety, depression, grief, 
and suicidal thoughts.14
One major risk will be changes in the 
nutritional quality and quantity of our food 
supply. Models project that crop yields  
are likely to fall in the Sahel, southern  
Africa, the Mediterranean, Central Europe,  
and the Amazon. Livestock will be affected  
too: rising temperatures may reduce  
the amount or quality of their feed and 
increase the spread of disease within  
herds. Experimental studies also show 
that higher carbon dioxide levels make 
crops such as wheat, rice, and barley 
grow faster, but with lower nutritional 
content. In experimental studies,  
CO2 concentrations expected later this 
century caused protein concentrations 
to decline by about 10%, micronutrients 
such as iron and zinc to decline by 
5–10%, and B vitamins to decline  
on average up to 30%. That could put 
about 600 million additional people in 
poor, rice-dependent countries at risk  
of adverse health consequences.15 
Additional investment to tackle these 
challenges is critical. Today, funding 
for health adaptation is negligible, 
comprising about 1% of global climate 
adaptation finance. A bigger investment 
would improve our health – and that  
of our children and grandchildren –  
in a warmer world.
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conjunction with poverty eradication and efforts to 
reduce inequalities”. Meeting this aspiration requires  
co-operation between national and sub-national authorities, 
civil society, the private sector, indigenous peoples,  
and local communities. Together they can forge 
fundamental societal transformations (see chapter 
“Transformation”) that simultaneously end dependence 
on fossil fuels, reduce consumption, and redesign cities 
and agriculture for the benefit of all.
Continued pressure
A steady drum beat of scientific reports has continued 
to document climate change and its impacts since the 
IPCC 1.5°C report was released.
For example, the 2018 US National Climate Assessment, 
released in November of that year, carefully documented 
the observed and potential impacts of climate change  
on the United States – overall, by region, and by key 
sector. The report received widespread media coverage, 
partly driven by recent disasters such as devastating 
forest fires in the western US and hurricanes in Texas 
and Puerto Rico. The assessment concluded that  
climate impacts were already disrupting economies  
and ecosystems, and that climate change poses serious 
risks to infrastructure, health, and the most vulnerable 
populations. Economic impacts could reach hundreds of 
billions of dollars by 2100. Reducing the risks of climate 
change through mitigation could save thousands of lives.
Many national, state, and local governments have taken 
these warnings seriously and introduced legislation  
to reduce emissions and adapt to impacts. For example, 
at a climate summit in California in 2018, CEOs of some 
of the world’s largest companies (such as Unilever) 
pledged to invest in emission reductions towards carbon 
neutrality. China is implementing policies to limit its use 
of coal, mandate use of renewable energy, and promote 
electric vehicles, although emissions are still likely to 
rise as the economy grows and incomes rise.
But many countries have not yet risen to the challenge 
or are reversing prior commitments to climate 
protection. The United States saw rollbacks of federal 
climate mitigation efforts such as a weakening of the 
Clean Power Plan. In Brazil, the October 2018 election 
led to reduced protections for the Amazon forest and 
eliminated budgets for climate-change-related activities. 
In Australia, the government continues to subsidize coal 
despite public support for climate action.7
The UN “Emissions Gap Report 2018” highlights the 
inadequacy of the current Paris pledges and calls for 
greater ambition.10 The IPCC report on “Climate Change 
and Land” shows how climate change is already  
reducing food security, and concludes that land use 
is responsible for almost a quarter of greenhouse 
gas emissions.11 Forest protection and food systems 
transformation are called out as essential to limiting 
warming (see chapter “Food”).
The next few years will no doubt bring many new 
reports and actions. The IPCC has its next major 
assessment due to be published in 2021. And the  
UN has asked countries to increase their ambitions  
for reducing emissions before 2020.
Scientists can step up to address the critical gaps 
identified in international and national reports.  
These include the need for better assessments  
of costs and benefits, including those factors –  
such as disease or culture – that cannot easily  
be converted to financial values. We need improved 
regional detail on projections of climate change  
and its impacts; further studies of the connections 
between climate change, climate responses,  
and sustainable development; and evaluations  
of how various mitigation and adaptation measures  
affect equality.
The UN Climate Change Summit in September 2019 
called upon leaders to develop concrete, realistic plans 
to enhance their commitments to reduce climate risks 
by 2020 by reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 45% 
over the next decade, and to net-zero emissions by 
2050, in order to limit warming to 1.5°C. The question 
is whether sufficient action will be taken, and whether 
humanity’s efforts to reduce warming will be compatible 
with sustainable development – without creating a bigger 
division of winners and losers.
The authors of this chapter were all involved in the 
writing and guidance of the IPCC special report on 
“Global Warming of 1.5°C”.
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The good news is that efforts to limit or adapt to 
warming can be beneficial to sustainable development 
goals. For example, increasing energy efficiency and 
renewable use help provide energy for all. Protecting 
forests to soak up carbon in places such as the Amazon 
and Indonesia can also support the goal of protecting 
biodiversity on land. Adapting agriculture to deal with 
lowered levels of available water can reduce hunger.
But there are often trade-offs between actions aiming to 
limit or adapt to climate change and other sustainability 
goals. Increasing the amount of forest or land used 
to grow bioenergy crops, for example, may mean 
decreasing the amount of land for crops and pasture 
– which could mean less food production, unless crop 
yields increase on the remaining land. Some adaptation  
or mitigation projects do not sufficiently include or 
address the needs of the poor, indigenous groups,  
or women, and may increase social inequality.  
Projects to adapt to sea-level rise by building sea  
walls may degrade ecosystems and biodiversity.
These trade-offs are not always obvious or well 
understood. Decarbonizing the energy system by, 
for example, shifting to renewables and increasing 
efficiency is estimated to need an increase in 
investment of about US$830 billion, about one-third 
more than current costs of US$2.4 trillion. Some oil-
producing or coal-exporting countries are concerned that 
this shift in finance will harm their economies or bring 
unemployment. But these costs need to be compared 
with the potential losses of a warming climate and 
the costs of adaptation, which have not yet been fully 
assessed. Development, if not carefully implemented, 
can increase the risks of climate change. For example, 
reducing poverty is often associated with increased 
consumption of fossil fuels and higher emissions.
It is possible to achieve all these valuable goals at  
once. The IPCC highlights the potential for fundamental 
societal transitions and transformations, including the 
potential of climate-resilient development pathways 
to “achieve ambitious mitigation and adaptation in 
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Fire on the planet today is different than it has 
ever been before.16 Climate change is increasing 
wildfire hazard over the majority of the planet, 
while a growing human presence is creating more 
sources of ignition and putting more infrastructure 
in the path of flames. Policies of fire suppression 
have made some forests more prone to larger 
fires. And the intentional clearing of rainforests for 
agriculture with fire is altering those landscapes 
forever – and creating deadly smoke.
There isn’t necessarily more fire: wildfire activity 
today is actually less than it was 100 years 
ago. Nor is fire inherently bad. Fire is a natural 
phenomenon in ecosystems from temperate 
forests to grasslands; some pines require the 
heat of a wildfire to melt their resin and open 
their cones.
But fire becomes a concern when it burns 
our homes, rapidly and dramatically shifts 
ecosystems, or chokes the air we breathe. And it 
is doing more of that. In 2019, a dramatic number 
of fires in the Amazon – a region that saw little fire 
before humans arrived – grabbed media headlines. 
Indonesian skies turned red from intentionally  
lit fires. Australia was ravaged by bush fires in  
the midst of an unusual drought. And the Arctic 
Circle saw unusually high occurrences of fire  
from Siberia to Greenland. California’s 2018  
Camp Fire was the costliest ever in the world  
(at US$16.5 billion in total losses), and tragically 
killed 85 people. Countries around the 
Mediterranean Basin are under the stress  
of catastrophic fires every summer.
Climate change has been identified as part of 
the reason. Warmer air pulls moisture out of 
vegetation – creating drier fuel – and feeds winds 
to fan flames. Each degree of air warming is 
thought to increase lightning strikes by about 
12%.17 As mountain ice packs melt, there is less 
water to feed landscapes over a long summer. 
Globally, the length of the fire weather season 
has increased by more than 18% between 1979 
and 2013.18 The majority of the burned area 
happens over a few short days of extreme fire 
weather – extreme weather that is becoming 
more common.
Climate models predict that many dry areas 
will get drier. And while increasing rain in some 
regions might counteract fire hazard, that isn’t 
always the case: more rain in winter and/or early 
spring, for example, can create more vegetation 
prone to burning in a later, drier summer.  
Global models predict that, overall, more  
regions will see an increased fire probability  
than a decreased one.19
Fire management is another part of the 
explanation for our current vulnerability. A kind 
of “war against fire” was initiated in the early 
20th century, predominantly in the United States: 
authorities viewed wildfire as a blight and adopted 
policies to stamp it out early. Decades of intensive 
fire suppression changed some landscapes 
dramatically, altering traditional patchworks of 
different ages and types of vegetation to a more 
uniform forest prone to larger conflagrations.  
As a result of both climate and policy, the annual 
burned area in the western United States 
increased more than fivefold from 1985 to 2015. 
Over the longer term, and globally, land use 
change has been the dominant determinant of 
fire regimes.20 Fire has remained relatively steady 
over the past 1,000 years or so, with a dramatic 
uptick from the 19th–20th century as farmers 
and settlers used fire to clear land during the 
Industrial Revolution. The total area burned then 
declined in the first decades of the 21st century, 
thanks to less-fire-prone agriculture taking 
the place of tropical savannas and grasslands. 
Models predict that climate change – in particular 
increasing temperatures – could become  
a prevailing force determining fire activity  
in the coming decades. 
The amount of carbon dioxide released by wildfires 
can be striking. The summer 2019 Siberian 
wildfires, which burned an area larger than 
Denmark, produced more CO2 than tens of millions 
of cars do over a year. If a forest regrows, over the 
long run a wildfire can be carbon neutral. But in 
Siberia and elsewhere the burning of peat – banked 
carbon that has been accumulating for thousands 
of years – or the thawing of permafrost leads to 
a net release of greenhouse gases, upsetting 
the balance. The replacement of rainforests with 
agriculture also hinders the planet’s ability to store 
carbon long term. 
Despite some media reports, razing the Amazon 
does not affect the “planet’s lungs”: vegetation 
is neutral when it comes to oxygen, absorbing as 
much as it emits. What it does do is affect human 
lungs, through the production of soot and smoke. 
Fire emissions are responsible for more than 
300,000 premature deaths annually from poor air 
quality.21 There are plenty of reasons to preserve 
rainforest ecosystems; saving people from air 
pollution is one of them.
A more sustainable planetary system will still 
have fire, and plenty of it. Humans need to learn 
to live with that, and to better manage the risk – 
in part by dialling back climate change. 
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Right-wing populism is on the rise around 
the world: a breed of politics that exploits 
people’s fears during times of economic 
decline and growing inequality, and that 
focuses on nationalist tendencies to clamp 
down on borders and reject immigrants.
The causes of this rise are complex and varied,  
and so the symptoms differ from country to country. 
One significant factor was the global financial crisis in 
2008: increased economic precariousness prompted 
greater social angst and created further opportunity  
for authoritarian populist politics to gain traction. In this 
sense there are many troubling similarities between  
the present global situation and the ascendancy of 
fascism after the Great Crash of 1929.
Climate change denialism is a thread that runs through 
many of the new right-wing nationalist and populist 
forces – of which US president Donald Trump is the 
most conspicuous example. At the very moment when 
international cooperation is essential if climate action 
is to be effective, many of the leaders of these right-
wing populist forces are trying to dismantle or weaken 
multilateral organizations such as the United Nations 
or the European Union. These political groups threaten 
to derail progress on the global response to climate 
change, and on new thinking about how to rewire  
the economy in pursuit of a more sustainable world.
But, at the same time, there is a rise of 
countervailing voices, inside the formal 
political ring, among liberal elites, and 
especially in grassroots movements.
Traditional left-of-centre 
parties have, in many 
cases, been slow to 
understand the impact 
that climate change has  
on the poorer, working- 
class constituencies that  
they claim to represent –  
thus cutting themselves off 
from their traditional voter base. 
They have tended to think of it as 
an environmental conservation issue, 
failing to grasp its human rights and 
social justice impacts. This has been  
a mistake. But as part of a shift in 
global attitudes to the climate emergency, some left-of-
centre political leaders have taken a lead. For example, 
in the United Kingdom it was the Labour Party that led 
the call for parliament to declare a “climate emergency” 
in May 2019, while in the United States, Democrat 
congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez is one of  
the sponsors of proposed legislation to create a new 
“green deal”.
But it is the myriad popular movements across the planet 
whose collective sense of frustration and growing anger 
about the impending climate disaster is gathering real 
momentum and offers the more potent counterbalance 
to the rise of populism. These movements are not only 
asking penetrating questions of those in power, but 
cannot be dismissed as being inside the cosmopolitan 
bubble. They are beginning to apply real political pressure 
commensurate with the immensity of humanity’s 
predicament because they are on the frontline of climate 
change and are feeling its impact more than any others.
The rise of right-wing populism
“Populism” is a contested term without a clearly 
defined meaning. Overall it has been described as  
a catch-all label for any kind of politics that promises  
to salve the fears of the discontented masses.
While populism claims to speak on behalf of the people, 
this rhetoric is often contradicted by the 
actions of populist leaders who seek  
to dismantle or undermine democratic 
institutions, or strike poses that  
are contrary to human rights –  
most blatantly by constructing  
an exclusionary nationalism that 
exploits prejudices against, 
for example, immigrants. 
Nonetheless, populism is 
ideologically capable of 
being right or left wing,  
or combining both.  
It can also cut across 
classes. Not all 
populists are anti-
democratic or anti-
poor. For example, 
Bolivia’s former president 
Evo Morales was often described 
as a populist, yet he was neither a 
climate denialist nor right wing: he brought 
inequality and poverty substantially down 
during his terms of office (2006–2019),  
and Bolivia was often at the front of the 
faction calling for radical climate action  
in international negotiations.
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In the context of climate change, the more troubling 
form of populism is right-wing populism, or authoritarian 
populism as some analysts call it. Harvard Kennedy 
School political scientist Pippa Norris explained in 2016 
that: “Populist authoritarianism can best be explained  
as a cultural backlash in Western societies against long-
term, ongoing social change.” As western societies have 
adopted more liberal social policies, from acceptance 
of same-sex marriage to support of agencies of global 
governance, some people have felt increasingly 
uncomfortable, Norris explains. “This long-term 
generational shift threatens many traditionalists’ cultural 
values. Less educated and older citizens fear becoming 
marginalized and left behind within their own countries.”1 
Those who feel left behind begin to rail against what 
they see as a cosmopolitan elite.
The data suggest that this trend started in earnest in 
the 1980s (see graph: Populism Rising). The mean vote 
share for populist authoritarian parties in post-industrial 
societies kept climbing, until 2016 earned a reputation  
as the year in which it became a powerful political force – 
with Trump’s election and the Brexit referendum, as well 
as the rise of populist parties across Europe.
Some have argued that climate change and environmental 
policy occupy a symbolic place in the populist struggle 
against a perceived elite. In many respects, climate 
change has yet to shake off its brand as an issue only  
of concern to people well off enough to worry about  
the future – protection of the environment is seen as  
a middle-class preoccupation that is too much of a luxury 
for the majority of people struggling to make ends meet, 
find or keep jobs, and put food on the tables of their 
beleaguered families.
Efforts to introduce carbon taxes provide an instructive 
and revealing case study. Rationally, given the danger 
posed by fossil fuels and carbon emissions, and the 
long-time failure to price such externalities, a carbon tax 
would appear to be a no-brainer. But these taxes impose 
a short-term cost on the public in exchange for a less-
tangible future benefit, often seemingly at the greater 
cost to the poor. In France, for example, protestors 
complained that the carbon tax revenues would be  
used in part to offset income tax cuts for the wealthy.
Hence Trump’s enthusiasm for repeating numerous  
fake news tropes about climate change that promote 
the idea that it is an invention of an urban, cosmopolitan 
elite. This elite, so the thinking goes, is indifferent to 
the interests of working men (especially) and women 
in industries that are often a cause of the climate 
emergency – such as the coal, oil, and combustion-
engine car industries.
One of Trump’s earliest acts as president was to 
announce that the United States would withdraw from 
the Paris Treaty on climate action. When discussing this 
momentous decision with his staff, Trump is reported  
to have said to his National Economic Council director 
Gary Cohn, “Gary, my voters don’t live on Park Avenue. 
They don’t care about the same things you care about.” 
One of many similarities between Trump and Jair 
Bolsonaro – often spoken of as “the Brazilian Trump” –  
is their rhetoric that climate change is a “liberal hoax”, 
and their use of the threat of job losses in manufacturing 
and fossil-fuel industries to sell a climate denial message.
Beyond denying the facts of climate change, there 
is a further denialist characteristic of populism that 
undermines progress on climate action. As former 
editor of The Guardian Alan Rusbridger puts it in his 
recent book,2 populism is also defined by “a denial  
of complexity”.
In a complex world facing complex problems, it is 
seductive for politicians to identify a single culprit (like 
immigrants) or an evil force (like universal healthcare)  
to blame for the erosion of society, the economy,  
and the welfare of the masses. This is hardly ever true, 
but it is compelling. Take the bewilderingly complicated 
set of relationships between food, energy, urban 
infrastructure, and exponential demographic growth  
and change (at least in the developing world).  
Climate change and its impacts are perhaps the  
epitome of a complex issue of interlinked social,  
political, and physical forces, making it an easy target  
for this sort of denialism.
So, populism ends up denying not just the science of 
climate change but also the complexity of the entire issue – 
which is critical for both diagnosing the problem and 
determining the prognosis and the prescription. Populism 
strips issues of nuance, and thereby obstructs progress.
A 2019 study mapping the climate agendas of right-
wing populist parties in Europe contains some revealing 
evidence:3 two thirds of right-wing populist members of 
the European Parliament (MEPs) “regularly vote against 
climate and energy policy measures”, while half of all 
votes against resolutions on climate and energy in the 
European Parliament come from right-wing populist 
party members. Of the 21 right-wing populist parties that 
were analysed, 7 were found to “deny climate change, 
its anthropogenic causes, and negative consequences”. 
According to estimates based on World Resources 
Institute global greenhouse-gas emissions data,  
about 30% of global emissions come from countries  
led by populist leaders.4
Humanity is entering a crucial decade in which it will either 
set course for a new economic paradigm, or else fail to 
act with sufficient urgency and transformative intensity. 
Having left it so late to prevent a 2°C rise in global 
temperatures, bold and decisive choices will have to be 
taken by political leaders. But the political zeitgeist could 
not (in some respects) be less conducive to doing so.
The growing force of authoritarian populism will have 
to be pushed back by a political force of at least equal 
power and momentum. And on that front, things are 
changing – and fast.
The countervailing progressives
I first encountered the expression “authoritarian 
populism” in an article5 by a fellow South African activist 
academic, Vishwas Satgar, in 2016. I had known  
him for years as an anti-apartheid activist – and then, 
post-1994 and South Africa’s first democratic election, 
as an activist for social justice and a leading intellectual 
in the South African left. Satgar is now leading the 
call for a Climate Justice Charter 6 in South Africa, and 
collaborating closely with a global network of activists. 
As an international relations professor at Witwatersrand 
University, he is monitoring trends in civil activism and 
mobilization – potentially powerful countervailing forces 
against populism.
Interestingly, it has taken a long while for progressive 
activists, political leaders, and analysts to join the dots 
between climate change and social justice, forming what 
are sometimes called “red-green alliances” (the red 
referring to progressive, left-of-centre politics; the green 
to environmentalism). This has been in many respects  
a failure of left-of-centre politics, because the evidence 
that those most vulnerable to climate change are those 
with the least material wealth and other resources to 
defend themselves is overwhelming.
As Satgar noted at a European Education and Sustainability 
Leadership Summit in Berlin in May 2019, many far-
left political movements have failed in recent decades, 
from Soviet to African socialism. Over the same time 
period, capitalism has risen to new heights – a type of 
capitalism that “is unresponsive to people’s needs at 
a time of deepening inequality and systemic crises in 
natural resources such as water, escalated by climate 
change”.7 This has created a global crisis in support for 
liberal democracies, creating a space for authoritarian 
populists to exploit.
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Yet simultaneously, Satgar pointed out, there has been  
a long, 500-year history of activism by mostly indigenous 
peoples to sustain the ecosystems upon which they 
depend. Since 1994, for example, the Mexican Zapatista 
Army of National Liberation has fought to return control 
of natural resources to indigenous hands; in 1999–2000, 
protests in Cochabamba, Bolivia, successfully fought 
to reverse the privatization of the city’s water supply; 
and in the Niger Delta, Ogoni people continue to fight, 
against great violence, the environmental damage done 
by oil spills and the company Royal Dutch Shell. Satgar 
maintains that as the systemic environmental crisis 
grows, so these indigenous-led forces are also growing.
Elsewhere, there are other forms of protest and 
mobilization. Greta Thunberg’s poignant as well  
as pointed advocacy has made her a poster child to 
juxtapose against Trump’s crude climate denialism –  
a powerful voice against climate inaction by political 
leaders, matched by the energy both of the children-
led #FridaysForFuture 
across the world and 
the Extinction Rebellion 
protests in many major 
capital cities.
At face value, this might 
appear to be a strong 
countervailing force. 
But is it politically strong 
enough and will it work? 
History suggests that 
previous efforts to build 
transnational progressive 
political movements 
have often failed to 
institutionalize the 
relationships between 
civil and social forces or 
develop a programmatic 
politics. In other words, 
they have been too 
disparate, too thinly 
spread, too incoherent 
in their strategy and 
communications to have 
the necessary impact.
Sociologist Zeynep Tufekci has thought a lot about this. 
She has firsthand research experience of the Zapatistas; 
she was in Tahrir Square for Egypt’s revolution; and she 
was in lower Manhattan for Occupy Wall Street. She notes 
that the digital era is not always as successful as one 
might think in organizing movements: “Modern networked 
movements can scale up quickly and take care of all 
sorts of logistical tasks without building any substantial 
organization cavity before the first protest or march … 
However, with this speed comes weakness.”8 The lack of 
strategic organization can create a splintering of purpose, 
methods, and impact – and a lack of clear direction after 
change has been implemented.
There is clearly a new wave of activist energy – 
manifesting in movements like Me Too, the Women’s 
March, Black Lives Matter, #FridaysForFuture, Extinction 
Rebellion, Sunrise, 350.org, and the successful global 
campaign against plastic and straws specifically. The trick 
will be to effectively connect these movements to 
matters of global social justice, and to give them enough 
coherence to be effective.
So, on the one hand, Thunberg and the student strike 
movement does serve to foreground critical inter-
generational justice issues, while ringing the bell for 
more urgent action to be taken and raising awareness 
of the climate emergency. But Satgar argues that this 
isn’t, yet, enough. Real socio-economic transformation 
will require movements that at their core defend life at 
the frontline of climate shocks. Thus, real transformation 
requires a focus on climate justice rather than climate 
awareness – one that not only joins the dots between 
ecological degradation and human rights, but also seeks 
remedial action and a transformation in the way the 
economy operates and capital is deployed.
How can Thunberg 
and the student strike 
movement in the  
global north connect,  
for example, with  
1.6 million children  
that are displaced  
in Malawi, Zimbabwe, 
and Mozambique  
from the cyclones,  
or the 300,000 women 
and children impacted 
by drought in Kenya 
and Somalia? Such 
connections need  
to be made in order 
to turn these nascent 
movements into 
powerful advocates  
for climate justice,  
or “eco-social justice”  
as some call it.
This is far easier said 
than done (and far 
harder than simply 
dismissing climate 
science as a hoax with the flick of a Twitter pen).  
There are people seeking to study and effect large- 
scale transformations of society, and steer them  
in the right direction. But it is an emerging field with  
a lot of complexity (see chapter “Transformation”).
In South Africa, Satgar continues to work painstakingly 
with others to establish a Climate Justice Charter, 
whose purpose is to “unite important players in the 
fragmented civil society, environmental justice, and 
climate justice and water sectors of South Africa” while 
establishing a set of principles to guide a “transformative 
just transition” away from “carbon capitalism”. Satgar 
has a vision of South Africa as a “climate justice state” 
or a “democratic climate emergency state”. He believes 
it could carry the rest of the continent with it, creating 
a knock-on effect on the global political order: “it would 
contribute to a global tipping point”.7
Inflexion point?
Writing in The New Yorker in May 2019, cofounder of 
the grassroots climate campaign 350.org Bill McKibben9 
alluded to previous “climate moments” – in 1988 NASA 
made a key presentation to Congress, and in the mid-
2000s Al Gore’s An Inconvenient Truth made waves. 
Neither led to sufficient action by Congress or the White 
House. But “this third climate moment is rooted in 
broad movements, not élite opinion,” wrote McKibben 
“and so it feels different. Right now, a group of young 
people is touring the country pushing for action on  
a Green New Deal … which would push for the rapid 
decarbonization of America’s energy supply. Polls show 
surprisingly widespread public support for it, and various 
versions are being introduced in cities and states across 
the nation, as well as in other countries”.
Meanwhile the emerging overlap between environmental 
activists and left-leaning social justice activists – the so-
called red-green alliance – is becoming clearer. A CNN poll 
in 2019 revealed that democratic voters cared more about 
climate change than about any other issue in the lead-up 
to the 2020 US presidential election. Many on the left 
have woken up to both the threats and the opportunities 
presented by the crisis. But you don’t need to be on the 
left to recognize the danger and the need to press for 
urgent action. Everyone is vulnerable to the future risks 
from climate change.
For this to be an inflexion point – a turning point that 
changes the course of history – a political struggle  
will need to be won. And the fight for climate justice  
in the face of right-wing populist climate denialism  
is a titanic one.
A new paradigm for planetary living in a just world is 
possible, but the current wave of activism will have to 
overcome its present limits. Climate policy and politics 
need to be understood as occurring within a complex 
context involving a wide array of actors and different 
levels of governance.
Trump-like trajectories into the so-called “post-truth” 
world of climate denial, charged by the amplifying impact 
of social media, distract from and obstruct the necessary 
action. Despite its flaws, the digital age presents  
a huge opportunity to impose a counter-narrative,  
and for recruiting new activists. People can connect  
more easily across seas and time-zones. Climate 
denialism can be rebutted and populist rhetoric rebuffed. 
Protests can be arranged quickly. And the young will do 
it best, not least because they have the deepest vested 
interest of all: it is their future that is at stake.
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Climate Stance
Where right-wing populists stand on climate 
change science. Source: Adelphi, 2019
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O C E A N
GOVErnIng  
THE HIgH SEaS 
Today, the ocean is front-page news. 
Officials from around the world are 
negotiating a new United Nations 
treaty to govern the high seas. Ocean 
plastic pollution has captured the world’s 
attention. Mining of the international 
seabed is about to become a reality.  
And while future “fish wars” lurk on  
the horizon, scientists are just starting  
to understand the genes that enable life  
in the ocean’s most extreme environments,  
and the biotechnology community  
is figuring out ways to use them. 
The importance of the ocean for the biosphere and 
human well-being is immense. Over 3 billion people  
are dependent on functioning marine ecosystems  
as their primary source of protein, and the livelihoods  
of nearly half of humanity are linked to marine and 
coastal biodiversity.1 The ocean shapes the earth’s 
climate, and plays a vital role in the customs, traditions, 
and identity of coastal communities around the world.  
Life has evolved to thrive in diverse ocean habitats,  
with these adaptations encoded in genomes that  
have drawn growing interest as promising sources  
of future medicines.
While the ocean was once considered too big  
to be significantly altered through human activity,  
it is now clear that it too has entered the Anthropocene, 
an age in which humans are the dominant influence. 
Stressors from climate change to pollution, fishing,  
and shipping have on average nearly doubled over  
the past decade, according to one recent study.2  
Melting ice has opened new passageways in the  
north for shipping and human impacts.
Industrial fishing occurs in more than 55% of the 
ocean’s area.3 Climate change is leading to warmer, 
more acidic waters: 2018 was the warmest year for  
the ocean on record, part of a warming trend expected  
to rapidly increase throughout the coming century,4 
while the hydrogen ion concentration of the ocean, 
which determines acidity, has gone up about 26%  
over the past 100 years. Tons of plastic enter the ocean 
each day, with ecological impacts that are still poorly 
understood (see box “Ocean plastics” ). Global maritime 
transport networks have contributed to the spread 
of invasive alien species, while overuse of antibiotics 
in aquaculture has contributed to the spread of 
antimicrobial-resistant pathogens. The Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change’s special report on the oceans 
and the cryosphere, released in September 2019, 
highlights how the resulting impacts on ecosystem 
services have had, overall, negative impacts on human 
health and well-being.
Alongside these storylines of bounty and degradation  
is a third, aspirational narrative of the ocean as a frontier 
and engine of future economic development. States 
have championed the notion of a blue economy that 
fosters human well-being, while simultaneously leading 
to greater equity and stewardship of marine resources.
Will we achieve this goal? How can the aspirations 
of more than 190 countries be accommodated,  
while avoiding degradation of the ocean and ensuring  
that future generations can continue to benefit from and 
enjoy its bounty? This is the domain of ocean governance, 
a complex network of rules, norms, mechanisms, and 
other instruments imposed on the ocean’s fluid boundaries.
The High Seas
Today, the biggest story in ocean governance is, 
appropriately, about the ocean’s biggest jurisdictional 
zone. Exclusive economic zones generally extend 200 
nautical miles from national coastlines and mark an area 
within which states enjoy a broad range of autonomy  
in the use of the marine environment and its resources. 
But nearly two-thirds of the ocean exists beyond such 
boundaries in vast “areas beyond national jurisdiction” 
(ABNJ), which cover some 64% of the ocean and nearly 
40% of the earth’s surface.
In the popular imagination, ABNJ evokes the notion  
of a vast ungoverned territory where the “freedom 
of the high seas” prevails. In reality, a multitude of 
organizations have mandates to govern aspects of ABNJ –  
though many experts argue that the sum of these does 
not equal good governance.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,  
for example, sets forth that the high seas are open for  
all states, subject to certain conditions, and that states 
shall cooperate on the conservation of marine living 
species. Many international fisheries are regulated  
under regional fisheries management organizations 
(RFMOs), which have been called upon to help protect 
vulnerable marine ecosystems by bodies including  
the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization. 
The International Maritime Organization, which is 
responsible for overseeing shipping, designates 
“particularly sensitive sea areas”; the International 
Seabed Authority, which is responsible for overseeing 
seabed mining, designates “areas of particular 
environmental interest”; and the Convention on 
Biological Diversity encourages states to conserve 
“ecologically or biologically significant areas” (EBSAs).
Robert Blasiak
Stockholm Resilience Centre,  
Stockholm University, Sweden
Nobuyuki Yagi
GSALS, University of Tokyo, Japan
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Yet there is little spatial overlap in these different areas 
designated for special attention or protection. More 
importantly, efforts by one sector to protect a certain 
area do nothing to limit the activities by other sectors. 
If an RFMO decides to ban bottom trawling in an area 
with sensitive hydrothermal vent systems, for example, 
this does not mean it is protected from seabed mining. 
RFMOs, like many international organizations, also  
suffer from the slow pace of consensus building:  
years of negotiations are needed to reach agreements 
that specify or restrict the rights of member countries.
This is a problem, given that states have agreed – 
through the 2010 Aichi Targets (part of the UN’s 
Convention on Biological Diversity), and the UN’s 2015 
Sustainable Development Goals – to place at least 
10% of coastal and marine areas under protection by 
2020 (compared with the 7.6% that enjoys some level 
of protection today). Many calls have already emerged 
to extend these targets: both Greenpeace and the 
International Union for Conservation of Nature have 
called for 30% of the ocean to be protected by 2030. 
Only 36% of the ocean is within national jurisdictions; 
no one expects virtually all of this to be set aside as 
marine protected areas, nor would preserving only 
coastal habitats be sufficient for comprehensive ocean 
conservation. Reaching such targets presupposes the 
establishment of a mechanism to protect vast swathes 
of the high seas.
Some academics have recently called for closing  
the high seas to fishing entirely. They note that only  
a small number of countries are actually engaged  
in fishing in ABNJ (six countries account for 77%  
of the ABNJ fishing fleet); most fishing in ABNJ  
would be unprofitable without subsidies; and the fish 
caught in the high seas make only a small contribution  
to global food security (2.4% of seafood, by volume, 
comes from the high seas).5,6 Within the current 
international governance landscape, any legally binding 
fisheries closures in ABNJ would need to take place 
through RFMOs, and large-scale closures are unlikely.  
Alternative avenues for reducing high seas fishing  
include phasing out subsidies enabling such operations, 
and consumer awareness campaigns aimed at 
generating market demand for locally sourced seafood.
Establishing a way to create marine protected areas in 
the high seas would be the most straightforward option. 
This is one element of UN treaty negotiations on the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity  
of areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ).
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Source: Marine Conservation Institute 2018.  
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and less reliant on physical samples, depending instead 
on genetic sequence data – often transmitted digitally – 
which falls outside the scope of the protocol.8
For now, this gap may not seem to present a huge 
concern. When researchers (including the lead author 
of this chapter) analysed 7.3 million genetic sequences 
associated with international patent filings, they found 
only 862 of the genes came from marine organisms;  
the vast majority were from terrestrial sources.9  
In all probability a far smaller number came from  
marine organisms found in ABNJ.
On the one hand, this might imply that there is limited 
reason to regulate access to genetic resources from 
ABNJ, since they are such a tiny fraction of patented 
genes. On the other hand, there is still cause for 
concern, as the genes of life in two-thirds of the  
ocean are at stake, and their properties and potential 
are largely unknown. In addition, there is an equity 
consideration: only a tiny handful of wealthy countries 
have the capacity to engage competitively in this sector  
of the blue economy. In this study, just ten countries  
were responsible for over 98% of the patent filings, 
leaving over 160 countries completely unrepresented.
Given the speed at which biotechnology advances  
have outpaced regulatory policy in other areas, 
negotiators should be dedicating time and effort  
to urgently resolve this issue. Most importantly,  
states should ensure that private sector companies  
and universities engaged in filing gene patents are 
included in the negotiations, as their expertise can  
provide real-world insight into this fast-paced sector and 
could be leveraged for future capacity-building efforts.
Protecting biodiversity
On December 24 in 2017, nearly 15 years of meetings 
concluded with UN General Assembly Resolution 
72/249: a decision to convene an intergovernmental 
conference to ensure the conservation and sustainable  
use of biological diversity in ABNJ. While the UN  
General Assembly resolution gives state negotiators  
the opportunity to enhance governance of nearly  
half the planet, it also ties their hands to some extent,  
as it cautions not to “undermine existing relevant legal 
instruments and frameworks”.
The focus is on four core issues: 
area-based management tools 
(including marine protected 
areas, or MPAs); marine genetic 
resources, or MGRs (including 
questions about the sharing 
of benefits from use of those 
resources); environmental 
impact assessments (EIAs); 
and capacity building and the 
transfer of marine technology 
(CB/TMT).
If one embraces acronyms, 
the BBNJ negotiations can 
be summarized fairly quickly: 
EIAs and CB/TMT are relatively 
straightforward; MPAs  
are tough; and MGRs are  
a nightmare of complexity. 
Yet the UN General Assembly 
resolution is clear that this  
is an all-or-nothing package 
deal, in which agreement is 
needed on all four elements. 
Addressing the comparatively 
simple issues and parking 
the tough ones for future 
negotiations is literally not  
an option. Moving from 
the current draft treaty to 
consensus text will certainly 
be a difficult task, but not 
impossible. At the time of 
writing, the intergovernmental 
conference, which has been 
envisioned as a series of four 
separate two-week meetings 
spread from 2018–2020,  
was three-quarters finished, 
and the draft text of what  
may become the BBNJ Treaty 
had been circulated.
Devising the new mechanism for creating high-seas 
MPAs, for example, will require careful work in order not 
to undermine other existing legal instruments. There are 
many legal intricacies that state negotiators will have  
to navigate. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs)  
and researchers have already leapfrogged the 
negotiations to start suggesting where future high-seas 
MPAs could be located. A recent study, for instance, 
considers “ecological connectivity”, mapping out and 
quantifying how various parts of ABNJ are connected  
to coastal ecosystems, in particular identifying parts  
of ABNJ that are most likely to impact coastal waters.7 
That could serve as a rational mechanism for identifying 
parts of the high seas that are critical to protect.  
Other efforts to identify candidate MPAs have focused  
on pinpointing irreplaceable systems such as those 
containing seamounts or hydrothermal vents (see Figure: 
Priority Areas).
It’s worth remembering that 
even if an agreement is reached 
to establish high seas MPAs, 
effective implementation  
and enforcement will be  
hard to ensure, and the cost-
sharing implications of such 
management activities will  
need to be considered further.
However tricky it is to decide 
upon MPAs, the truly Herculean 
task facing state negotiators 
is figuring out how to address 
genetic resources from ABNJ. 
Scientists have only begun 
to understand marine life in 
ABNJ, and the biotechnology 
community has just started to 
explore its commercial potential. 
But applications already range 
from a growing family of marine 
drugs (including five US FDA-
approved cancer treatments) 
to anti-aging cosmetic creams 
containing bacteria from worms 
living in hydrothermal vents.
Experience has shown that 
achieving equitable access to 
and subsequent sharing of the 
benefits from genetic resources 
has always been a major 
challenge for the international 
community. While regulatory 
policy often moves more  
slowly than the science,  
it is particularly challenging 
in the case of biotechnology, 
which is moving at light speed. 
Within the past ten years,  
for instance, DNA sequencing 
costs have dropped by  
five orders of magnitude.
Take, for example, the Convention on Biological 
Diversity’s Nagoya Protocol: an international agreement 
aimed at eliminating the worst forms of biopiracy 
through the establishment of access and benefit- 
sharing agreements. The need for such a protocol was 
already stated as the third objective of the Convention  
on Biological Diversity (in 1992), but the protocol was  
not agreed until 2010. By the time it finally entered  
into force in 2014, scientists had already grown less  
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Back in 2007, a climate-related shift in the 
distribution and abundance of Atlantic mackerel led 
to a series of unilateral and escalating responses  
by fishing nations wanting to take their “fair share” 
of the fish. The conflicts, dubbed the “mackerel 
war”, won’t be the last.
Research suggests that changing ocean conditions 
will increasingly contribute to the poleward shift  
of commercial fish stocks. A recent study found 
that, on average, species were moving into  
new territory at a rate of 70 km per decade.14 
Under a high greenhouse-gas emissions scenario, 
some states are expected to see up to 12 new 
commercially important fish species entering  
their exclusive economic zones by the end  
of the century. As various states lose and gain  
fish stocks, there is increased potential for  
inter-state conflict.
In one 2019 study, researchers (including chapter 
author Blasiak) collected and analysed 40 years 
of English-language news reports covering 
international conflicts related to fish, ranging from 
public condemnation of fishing activities all the 
way to military actions resulting in loss of life.15 
This dataset revealed a marked increase in fishery 
conflicts over the past 15 years, with East Asia  
and South East Asia emerging as the primary 
hotspots for conflicts to occur.
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O C E a n  
P L a S T I C S
The disposal of plastic at sea has been 
banned under the MARPOL Convention since 
1988, but enforcement is a huge problem.  
It is estimated that between 13,000  
and 35,000 tons of plastic enter the ocean 
every day. Around 322 million tons of plastic  
is produced annually, and only 20%  
is incinerated or recycled; the rest ends  
up in landfills or the natural environment.
Marine megafauna that have become 
entangled in abandoned, lost, or discarded 
fishing gear, or which have ingested large 
quantities of plastics, have become the topic 
of recurring news stories. Plastic does not 
decompose, but rather breaks down into 
smaller and smaller pieces: microplastic 
particles have been found in even the most 
remote deep-sea and polar regions of  
the ocean. The ingestion of microplastics  
by everything from filter-feeding mussels  
to commercial fish species has raised human 
health concerns, and while initial analysis 
suggests health impacts may be minimal,16 
the perception of seafood as a polluted food 
source could reshape consumption patterns.
China has been the primary importer of the 
world’s plastic waste, but ceased imports in 
early 2018. In May 2019, nearly all countries 
agreed in an amendment to the Basel 
Convention to stop exporting plastic waste  
to poor nations. The long-term impacts  
of this realignment of global flows of plastic 
waste are unclear.
In June 2019, the leaders of the G20 
developed the Osaka Blue Ocean Vision,  
with an aim to reduce additional pollution  
by marine plastic litter to zero by 2050. 
Although this is not a legally binding 
commitment, it is a signal for movement  
in the right direction.
Mining the seabed
Another controversial issue is seabed mining.  
Of particular interest are vast deposits of polymetallic 
manganese nodules spread across the ocean floor, 
cobalt-rich crusts around seamounts, and mineral 
deposits that form around hydrothermal vents.  
Metals such as cobalt, manganese, and nickel are 
needed for high-tech applications ranging from electric 
batteries to electronics such as smartphones.
Proponents of mining these deposits argue that  
demand for minerals has been rapidly growing,  
resulting in the land-based extraction of lower quality 
ore and the use of more energy-intensive mining 
methods.10 From this point of view, the seabed offers a 
new opportunity for environmentally responsible mining. 
Opponents, however, underscore the extent of scientific 
uncertainty about the seabed (the surfaces of Mars, 
Venus, and the moon, for instance, have been mapped  
at higher resolutions), and about the potential future 
impacts of mining activities. Toxic sediment plumes  
kicked up by mining activity, for example, can extend for 
miles from their source, and lead to sediment deposition 
rates thousands of times above natural levels.
A 2018 editorial in the journal Science set out the 
arguments for a precautionary approach, highlighting  
the extent of our ignorance of deep-sea ecosystems  
and arguing against a US administration proposal  
to open 90% of the country’s continental shelf to oil  
and gas drilling.11
The International Seabed Authority (ISA) already has  
the mandate to regulate all activities related to minerals 
in ABNJ and has developed multiple regulations on 
prospecting for polymetallic nodules (2000), sulphides 
(2010), and polymetallic crusts (2012). The next step is  
to develop regulations that move beyond the activities  
of exploration and prospecting to also govern exploitation. 
This process was started in 2014, and a set of ISA 
regulations to govern mineral exploitation in ABNJ  
is expected to be adopted by 2021.
The ISA has already designated nine Areas of Particular 
Environmental Interest (APEIs) that are protected 
from mining exploration, prospecting, and exploitation. 
This network covers 160,000 sq km across the 
Clarion-Clipperton Zone, an area of the Pacific Ocean 
characterized by rich deposits of polymetallic nodules. 
Recognizing the likely imminent expansion of commercial 
activities on the seafloor in ABNJ, independent 
researchers published a study in 2018 identifying other 
areas of the seabed to prioritize for conservation.12
Under the ISA’s proposed mining code, contractors will 
be required to conduct EIAs and establish preservation 
reference zones to help maintain biodiversity and 
ecosystem functions. Another encouraging signal has 
been sent by industry, which has actively sought out 
engagement with the scientific community to gauge 
environmental impacts of bioprospecting and exploration 
efforts. Yet many NGOs and conservation groups 
have categorically rejected deep-sea mining and have 
repeatedly stated that it “has no place in the world’s 
Agenda 2030 for sustainable development”.
Future challenges
Climate change remains a major question mark hanging 
over future ocean governance, as it is already changing 
conditions and the distribution of marine life, and such 
impacts are only expected to increase in the future  
(see box “Fish wars” ).
While international cooperation among states will 
be crucial for addressing existing and future ocean 
governance challenges, NGOs and the private sector are 
also key players. NGOs, for example, played a key role 
in pushing for the development of an international treaty 
on BBNJ, and are among the most vocal opponents of 
seabed mining. The private sector is also taking tentative 
steps towards embracing a role as ocean stewards rather 
than simply as ocean-based industries. Hopeful examples 
are provided by industry-based groups that aim to improve 
sustainable practices, such as the Global Salmon Initiative, 
the Seafood Business for Ocean Stewardship initiative, 
and the UN Global Compact Sustainable Ocean Business 
Action Platform.
While there is nervous optimism about the potential 
for the BBNJ negotiations to yield an ambitious and 
effective treaty, there are many more immediate and 
encouraging signals that ocean governance is moving  
in a positive direction.
Novel tools are enabling more direct action towards 
ensuring sustainable ocean governance. For example, 
the same blockchain technologies that underlie some 
virtual currencies are creating new levels of transparency 
and traceability in seafood supply chains. The Global 
Fishing Watch website, launched in 2016 by Google  
and nonprofits Oceana and SkyTruth, has made real- 
time vessel-tracking data publicly available and open  
to scrutiny. Attempts have also been made to estimate 
catches from illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) 
fishing using satellite remote-sensing images in the 
north-eastern Pacific.13
Ocean issues are also motivating action that transcends 
traditional alliances. The world leaders at the G20 summit 
in Osaka, Japan, June 2019, recognized the importance 
of addressing IUU fishing for ensuring the sustainable 
use of marine resources and conserving the marine 
environment, including biodiversity, and reaffirmed their 
commitment to end IUU fishing. If the pillars of ocean 
stewardship can become mainstream issues that unite 
governments, industry, and civil society, then there is 
room for optimism.
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In the 2010s, the media began reporting  
on groups of migrants from Central 
America walking thousands of miles  
to the US-Mexico border, fleeing poverty 
and violence and seeking a better life in  
the United States.
The US government labelled this migrant caravan 
phenomenon a “crisis” – not because of the devastating 
conditions faced by migrants at home and on the United 
States southern border, but because of the presence of 
unauthorized migrants in the United States. By November 
2018, the real crises intensified: in Tijuana, more than 
5,000 migrants were living in an overcrowded stadium 
awaiting their future; in the United States, child migrants 
were being separated from their parents.
The Central American migrant “crisis” is just one of many 
the world has seen in recent decades. As of September 
2019, the Syrian conflict had resulted in over 5.6 million 
refugees seeking refuge mainly in Turkey, Lebanon,  
and Jordan. As of 2018, 800,000 people had fled their 
home countries in North Africa as asylum seekers and 
refugees, some embarking on often-deadly boat trips 
across the Mediterranean. In each case, climate-related 
stresses ranging from droughts to famines seemingly 
add to the instability and violence that forced migrants 
are fleeing, only to run into increasingly unfriendly 
border policies.
For many observers in the wealthy, industrialized 
global North, the influx of forced migrants from Central 
America and the Middle East has been seen as a sign 
of an impending flood: their assumption is that climate 
change impacts will spur violence and/or push hundreds 
of millions of people into their borders, causing yet more 
violence and other problems. Current evidence and 
projections do not support these extreme scenarios.
Despite headlines to the contrary, research suggests 
that climate change is not likely to spur new patterns 
of migration that don’t already exist, nor is it a major 
determinant of political instability and interstate conflict. 
For every case in which a climate-change-related disaster 
was associated with violence or migration, there are 
hundreds where such disasters were met with peace  
and effective management. In the instances where 
climate change does accelerate migration, sound 
migration policy can play a critical role in the outcomes.
In other words, humanity is not at the mercy of forces 
seemingly beyond our control: human decision-making 
lies at the heart of crises, not climate change alone. 
Good migration policy, climate-adaptation interventions, 
and disaster-mitigation actions can help to stem 
difficulties and boost positive effects for migrants  
and their host communities, even in the face of violence 
and climate disasters. Misguided policy, based on 
incorrect assumptions, exaggerated fears, and alarmism, 
does little to help vulnerable people adapt to our planet’s 
changing conditions.
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Migrants from South America in an overcrowded sports complex in Tijuana in November 2018.
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People in motion
How many people do we expect will move because  
of climate change? The answers depend almost entirely 
on how fast we reduce emissions, and on the policy 
interventions we implement to shape vulnerability. 
 This cannot be overstated: the number of future migrants 
from climate change depends on what governments and 
policymakers do right now.
With the intent of highlighting the plight of climate-
vulnerable people, advocacy and policy agencies have 
been keen to quantify migration and displacement  
due to climate change and conflict, and to attempt  
to predict future migration. An unfortunate unintended 
consequence of these predictions has been to feed 
alarmist, reactionary narratives.
British environmentalist Norman Myers’s 2002 paper,  
for example, identified 25 million environmental 
“refugees” in 1995 and predicted – based on broad 
assumptions – a doubling of this number by 2010, 
followed by as many as 200 million people driven from 
their homes by climate disasters by 2100.1 Others, 
relying on vague modelling frameworks, have warned 
of climate migrants numbering up to 1 billion by 2100. 
Such statements, while intending to hammer home the 
severity of consequences from climate change, serve 
to fuel public alarm and xenophobic policy about, as one 
paper satirically noted, “Climate Barbarians at the Gate”.2
Such predictions are speculative: the real numbers 
may ultimately prove lower or even higher. We just 
don’t know. Given our uncertainties, it makes more 
sense to rely on methodical empirical observations 
of persons currently displaced, and focus on what 
can be done to accommodate forced migrants now. 
The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) 
reports that in 2017, 18.8 million people were newly 
displaced by disasters,3 but while the number of 
recorded disaster events is rising, the number  
of people displaced by them shows no clear trend 
(see Figure: Disaster Displacement). The total number 
of forced migrants, including persons displaced from 
conflict and other drivers, is much higher: 70.8 million 
in 2018. 
While the movement of tens of millions of people 
around the globe is significant – especially for migrants 
and hosts who need help in their transitions – the world 
can accommodate tens of millions of displaced people 
per year if it chooses to do so. Even if numbers of forced 
migrations rise dramatically over time, it is possible for 
policies to keep pace.
Future climate change will likely bring more frequent 
and intense disasters related to rising temperatures, 
drought, and sea-level rise. Small island developing 
nations, such as Kiribati, Tuvalu, and the Maldives, may 
lose their entire land surface during the 21st and 22nd 
centuries, rendering their populations stateless. In this 
and other ways, climate change will surely prompt many 
people to move, whose potential difficulties should 
not be minimized or trivialized. Yet whether there are 
problematic “floods” of people crossing national borders 
depends less on these physical factors, and more on 
human decisions and actions.
To move or not to move
Observers in wealthy, industrialized countries tend  
to imagine that migration is what happens when 
something goes wrong, like when a person loses their 
home or livelihood due to some unforeseen disaster.  
But migration may be better thought of as a universal 
adaptive human strategy for pursuing well-being, 
prosperity, and development, a strategy that people 
all over the world use to manage economic and 
environmental risks.
Throughout the whole of human history, people have 
been in motion. During the 20th century, the rapid rise 
in human development and standards of living is largely 
attributable to migration from rural agricultural areas 
to cities, where migrants built much of our modern 
industrialized societies (see box “The Liveable City”). 
Research shows that migrants contribute to their hosts’ 
economic development (as well as development back in 
their original hometowns), provide economic and cultural 
diversity to their host societies, and are generally more 
law abiding than their hosts.4
Problems primarily occur not when people migrate,  
but rather when peoples’ movement is impinged,  
for one reason or another. When people cannot  
move due to poverty, poor health, or discrimination,  
or because their cultural and personal attachments  
to a place are strong, they may enter what researchers 
call “mobility traps”. In these circumstances, people are 
unable to access the many benefits of migration.
In the last 60–70 years, in the nation-state system 
that arose following the Second World War, borders 
have become a real impediment to movement. 
Restrictive border policies can have a range of negative 
consequences for migrants, including sharpening the 
disparity of wealth within and across our societies.5 
People are generally better off – both migrants and  
host communities – when we reduce such barriers.6
Heated conflict?
The facts about the relationship between climate change 
and conflict are equally muddied in the public mind.
Some studies have produced dramatic findings that seem 
to indicate environmental factors – such as temperature 
extremes or drought – universally determine complex 
social outcomes such as political violence. For example, 
one influential paper in 2013 claimed that each standard 
deviation change in temperature rise or rainfall prompts 
a 14% rise in intergroup conflict.7 Such findings are 
very appealing to “common sense” desires for simple 
explanations of complex phenomena.
But the current consensus acknowledges that reality  
is far more complicated, and outcomes rely heavily  
on the social and political context. A recently published 
survey of nearly a dozen experts showed that while they 
generally agree that climate change may affect conflict 
within countries, they also judged socio-economic factors 
and political histories as far more important determinants 
of violence – especially between different nations.8  
Each case is different; there are few, if any, universal rules.9
Many of the studies that draw simple conclusions 
about the links between climate and conflict have been 
accused of falling victim to common research biases10 
such as the “streetlight effect” – the idea that people 
tend to look where it is easiest to look, rather than where 
they should look (like hunting for lost keys at night only 
where the streetlights shine). Studies tend to focus 
only on areas where there are persistent problems with 
violence; ignoring, for example, areas that might have 
seen climate change impacts, but no resulting violence. 
Because climate change has already affected every 
region on earth, studies are able to find climate  
change impacts in nearly all instances of civil conflict. 
Spurious findings can be exacerbated by, or perpetuate, 
ideological biases: African countries, for example,  
are often a focus of studies on climate stress and 
violence, which may bolster racist notions that these 
countries are more inherently violent.
Research targeted at simple explanations tends to 
artificially simplify complex outcomes, or unhelpfully 
obscure the roles of colonial history and human agency. 
This can translate to incorrect or misleading narratives, 
particularly in the popular media.
Take, for example, the recent case of Syrian refugees. 
A narrative has emerged in some research that climate 
change and drought played a central role in precipitating 
the Syrian Civil War and the humanitarian crisis that 
surrounds it. One now-famous 2015 paper11 claimed 
that drought in Syria led to unemployment in rural areas, 
which prompted migration to the nation’s cities,  
where discontent with the government was most  
acute. In other words, climate change created angry 
migrants who later became political dissidents. 
These ideas have been countered by researchers with 
evidence supporting an alternative explanation. While the 
drought and violence in Syria’s cities coincided in time,  
as they pointed out, there was no evidence that one 
caused the other; a similar dry period in Iraq at the same 
time notably did not cause migration or violence.
The conflict in Syria was based on pre-existing popular 
discontent with the Assad regime. Emboldened by the 
Arab Spring movement, Syrian political dissidents led 
massive public demonstrations, which the government 
met with violence. The heavy-handed government 
response galvanized dissenters against the Assad regime, 
and violence ultimately escalated into civil war. If the 
drought played a role, it was to amplify existing popular 
discontent with the Assad regime for its removal of 
agricultural subsidies and poor drought-recovery choices, 
which disproportionately affected the working poor  
and further disenfranchised some segments of society.12
Where migration occurred in Syria, it consisted almost 
entirely of people fleeing civil-war-related violence.
Complex realities
The fact is that researchers struggle to find any uniform 
trends of migration creating social problems, such as 
violence or conflicts over resources. Mounting evidence 
indicates that migration, rather, is a key strategy for 
adapting to climate change, and when migration 
alternatives are readily available – when there are few 
social, economic, and political barriers to migration – then 
vulnerable people are better able to recover and contribute.
This is not to say that environmental stress has no  
role to play at all. In Central America, for example,  
where violence and instability have proven to be  
an explosive combination, disasters may have been  
a (less-often-acknowledged) contributing factor.
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While the number of disaster events each year has trended upwards, displacement events show no clear trend. 
Source: Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, 2019
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In autumn 1998, Hurricane Mitch dealt a catastrophic 
blow to Honduras, Nicaragua, and parts of Guatemala. 
The torrential rainfall inundated Honduras, devastating 
infrastructure, homes, and crops, “reversing 50 years  
of progress towards development”, in the words of then-
president Carlos Flores. As the floods subsided and the 
nation began to recover, it is estimated that a quarter  
of the population had been temporarily displaced,  
and about 100,000 had migrated to the United States.
What is not well understood (and is, indeed, very 
difficult to study) is whether Hurricane Mitch, its strain 
on institutions, its impact on development, and the 
needs it imposed on society, made these nations 
more susceptible to the street gangs that are largely 
responsible for criminal violence. After Hurricane Mitch, 
infamous street gangs, such as Barrio 18, proliferated  
in cities like Tegucigalpa, Honduras, where state 
institutions were reeling from disaster, displacement  
had totally reorganized society, and post-disaster recovery 
had stalled.
Likewise, in its disaster 
recovery response, 
the Honduran state 
prioritized rebuilding 
and expanding 
infrastructure, roads, 
and bridges into 
rural, historically 
disconnected regions. 
The post-disaster 
economic collapse 
and expansion of rural 
infrastructure could be 
offered as one among 
the many reasons that 
Honduras became 
attractive as a hub  
for drug trafficking.
Since the mid-2000s, 
with the proliferation 
of street gangs and the 
influx of narco-trafficking, 
Central America has held 
the ignominious claim to the highest homicide rates  
in the world. Cities like San Pedro Sula, Honduras,  
have rates of violent death higher than active war 
zones. Poor, disenfranchised boys growing up in these 
circumstances face very grim prospects, including 
impoverishment and recruitment into violent street 
gangs. If they do join gangs, or even appear to, they face 
persecution by state authorities. For many teenage boys, 
Central American cities are so dangerous that they  
may essentially be uninhabitable, and the migration of 
young people we have observed from Central America  
is a simple reflection of this reality.
It would be irresponsible to claim that a hurricane caused 
street gangs and drug trafficking in Central America. 
Other catastrophic storms have affected similarly 
vulnerable countries without the same outcomes.  
But there are specific ways that these factors may  
have worked together to shape the exodus of migrants 
we have witnessed this decade. The common 
denominator is the region’s structural vulnerability  
to a range of social and environmental disasters.
Good hosts
Despite mounting evidence about the complex interplay 
between climate change, violence, and migration, 
officials often still rely on “common sense” narratives to 
justify the responses of governments and development  
or humanitarian agencies – often to ill effect.
For example, the notion that climate-induced migration 
represents a national security risk may inspire nations 
to prepare for climate change with increased border 
security, militarized surveillance and policing of migration. 
The practical implications of setting policy on the  
basis of unsubstantiated claims are deeply problematic 
for vulnerable people, and may encourage radical 
ideologies, including nationalism, militarism, 
protectionism, 
isolationism, 
and xenophobia.
Further, victimizing 
vulnerable people 
reduces the space 
to develop win-win 
solutions that help 
migrants build resilience 
and open opportunities 
for host societies  
to gain from migrants’ 
energy, experience,  
and citizenship.  
When systems are 
hostile to migrants,  
such as imposing  
strictly enforced  
migrant quotas or 
increased border 
security, migrants are 
less able to participate 
fully in societies  
and economies.6 
Instead of focusing on the climate determinants of 
conflict and migration, researchers should pay closer 
attention to instances when no violence occurred after 
disaster despite expectations to the contrary, or when 
no migration occurred in the face of an overwhelming 
climate stressor.
Important general lessons come from cases like 
Bangladesh, for example, where policies have dramatically 
reduced the destabilizing impacts of cyclones. In  
1970, the Bhola Cyclone struck southern Bangladesh,  
resulting in large-scale displacement, famine, and the 
deaths of an estimated 500,000 people, making it the 
deadliest natural disaster in history. Partly in response 
to this, in the late 1990s the Bangladesh government 
began and sustained a set of policies to reduce disaster 
vulnerability, which included investments in early 
warning systems and cyclone shelters. As a direct result 
of these investments, when in the mid-2000s a series  
of cyclones struck Bangladesh with similar force 
(Cyclones Sidr and Aila), death tolls were dramatically 
lower, and only small changes in migration were observed.
Likewise, there are lessons to be learned from cases 
when climate change and conflict do drive migration, 
but social protections in host communities ease 
transitions. For example, one study on the integration 
of Afghan refugees in Australia showed that people 
given permanent protected visa status fared significantly 
better than those given temporary visas across a 
range of outcomes, including better mental health, 
stronger English language acquisition, and more social 
engagement.6 When migrants are treated like permanent 
members of society, they contribute as permanent 
members of society.
Studies like these challenge narratives and policies that 
seek to block migration from climate change, and instead 
encourage decision makers to focus on reducing the risk 
of disasters and accommodating migration when it would 
likely enable adaptation.
Responding to the Central American migrants,  
US policymakers – lacking the appetite to address 
violence, instability, and disasters at their root  
in Central America, or to formulate social protections  
and accommodations to help migrants better contribute  
to American society – have created political turmoil  
within the American political system. Long-standing 
anti-immigrant sentiments in the United States have 
provided a basis for an official federal policy of separating 
unauthorized Central American children from their parents 
upon arrival – a move that has been sharply criticized  
as unethical, if not illegal. What this case highlights 
is that the “crises” around migration are in the public 
imagination: ideologies, attitudes, and feelings towards 
migrants, and how these justify our treatment of migrants. 
How a society treats forced migrants is a test of its values. 
The world is facing unprecedented environmental stress. 
But if we choose to invest in solutions, we can greatly 
reduce potential conflict and strain. The costs of pre-
emptive political action and timely humanitarian aid are 
far outweighed by the consequences of doing nothing.
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Numbers of migrants displaced from disaster and conflict in 2018. Source: Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, 2019
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In 2019, Los Angeles – a city renowned for its 
smog – vowed to plant 90,000 trees over the 
next two years as part of its Green New Deal. 
New York City passed a Climate Mobilization  
Act that requires green roofs or solar panels on 
new buildings, catching up with similar legislation 
in Germany and elsewhere. At the C40 World 
Mayors Summit in Copenhagen in October 2019, 
it was announced that 30 cities (a third of its 
membership), from Athens to Washington,  
have passed peak emissions and, on average, 
cut their emissions by 22% since 2009. At the 
same meeting, 35 mayors – from Amman to 
Quito – signed a clean air pledge, even while air 
pollution in New Delhi reached 50 times the level 
deemed safe by the World Health Organization.
As the world’s population grows, people continue 
to flock to cities for the opportunities they provide. 
More than 4 billion of the planet’s 7.7 billion people 
currently live in urban areas, and this is increasing 
by 1 million every 10 days.13 By 2050, it is 
anticipated that two out of every three people on 
the planet will be living urban. In the face of this 
dramatic demographic change, many are working 
hard to ensure that cities of the future are more 
sustainable, resilient, and equitable: in short,  
more liveable.
Although cities’ massive infrastructures have 
voracious energy demands and a traditional 
reliance on fossil fuels (and so produce more than 
60% of the planet’s greenhouse gases, according 
to Unique Nature Habitats), cities provide huge 
opportunities for sustainability. Carbon emissions 
are lower per capita, on average, in cities:14 
greenhouse gas emissions for New Yorkers 
have been estimated to be less than one-third 
of the national average for the United States, 
for example. Cities are engines of innovation, 
education, and creativity, and hotbeds for 
experimentation with new technologies or social 
systems. As the C40 shows, city leaders have 
proved more willing and able to commit to 
more stringent climate change initiatives than 
nations. Satellite images combined with social 
media posts and data from buildings and cars 
have spurred a revolution in data availability in 
the last five years, making it easier to measure 
how people are living in cities and where further 
efficiencies can be gained.
Yet cities are also some of the most vulnerable 
places on the planet. The urban socio-economic 
divide can be huge: two-thirds of the poor in Latin 
America reside in urban areas. Many cities are 
heating up faster than surrounding landscapes 
as the pavement soaks up more sunlight and 
the buildings generate more heat, aggravating 
heatwaves and their health impacts.15 Some 90% 
of urban areas are on coastlines and potentially 
vulnerable to rising sea levels; all cities remain 
vulnerable to floods and droughts. Air pollution, 
especially from traffic, can be deadly: the 1952 
London Smog is thought to have caused more than 
4,000 deaths; Delhi and Beijing frequently have  
air pollution levels many times above standards.16 
Pushing systems to be efficient, which is often 
the focus of smart cities and urban sustainability 
agendas, can strip them of much-needed 
redundancy: the backup systems and multiple 
solutions to social and technological issues that 
make cities flexible and resilient to heat waves,  
air pollution and coastal flooding.17 
Fortunately, making cities more person-centric, 
or more liveable, often makes them both more 
sustainable and more resilient. Many of these 
solutions are based in nature, mixing the green 
with the grey.18 In China, for example, so-called 
“sponge cities” use permeable roads and 
incorporate wetlands to build flood resilience  
into an urban landscape. Many cities are 
incorporating more green space to lower the heat 
island effect. Some desert cities are building bus 
stops with giant solar panels that simultaneously 
provide shade and renewable power. 
The transition to “better” cities will not be easy,  
or uniform. The IPCC estimates that the energy 
use by buildings will have to go down by 80–90% 
by 2050, and transport by 30%, in order to hit 
a goal of 1.5°C temperature rise.19 Some Asian 
cities are moving towards using more cars, for 
example (in China, cars on the road went from 
about 65 million in 2008 to 240 million in 2018, 
while in the United States numbers stayed fairly 
flat), but other cities, like Copenhagen, are fighting 
to bring back bikes (by 2025, they aim to have half 
of all commutes done by bicycle). In other places, 
developments are changing what we think of as  
a city: in parts of Africa and Asia, new urbanization 
sometimes consists of small villages and larger 
towns linking virtually to join their economies  
into city-like models, though populations remain 
fairly dispersed. 
In the far future, digitization technologies may 
undercut the traditional model of more jobs  
being available in cities, changing the model  
of who desires to live where – and why.  
The key is to provide them with efficient, 
equitable, and resilient options.
The city of Los Angeles vowed to plant 
90,000 trees over the next two years.
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Measles, one of the world’s most 
contagious diseases, still kills over 100,000 
children every year. Once on its way to 
eradication, in recent years epidemics have 
broken out in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Sudan, and the Philippines – and in 
the rich suburbs of New York and Auckland. 
In 2018, 140,000 people died as cases 
surged worldwide. 
One cause of this unexpected rise in disease is online 
disinformation. A recent Nature opinion piece warned that 
the biggest pandemic risk today is “viral misinformation” 
eroding public trust in vaccines.1 One study has estimated 
that about half of all parents with young children are 
exposed to anti-vaccine messages on social media.2
The flow of information 
in the world is changing. 
Today, around half of 
the planet’s 7.6 billion 
people are online, 
where they are deeply 
influenced by social 
media, search engines, 
and e-commerce 
algorithms. These roll 
together into a new kind 
of extractive industry, 
which uses algorithms 
rather than shovels, to 
mine not ores but data. 
The information traders 
like Facebook, Google, 
and Amazon today  
wield immense 
power. With access 
to the private details, 
consumption habits, 
desires, and moods  
of the world’s citizens, 
they have the power 
to influence behaviour, 
change the rules 
of commerce and 
communication, operate secretly, and destroy industries.  
Companies capitalize on their algorithms and wealth  
of data to allow laser targeting of audiences via 
computational propaganda. 
Digital platforms, specifically social media, favour the 
spread of information designed to engage with emotion 
over reason. One study has shown that false news – which 
often triggers strong reactions of surprise, disgust, or fear – 
travels 6 times faster and can reach up to 100 times more 
people than accurate information.3 Social media platforms 
have industrialized the spread of disinformation – and made 
political discourse more aggressive.
The scale of the problem is now frighteningly apparent. 
In the United Kingdom, the highly successful campaign 
to leave the European Union (Brexit) focused on 
emotionally charged messages of fear of immigration  
and “take back control”, while the campaign to 
remain, based on the logic of economic cooperation, 
was destined for low engagement. As the last US 
presidential election reached its conclusion, about 
one in four Americans visited a “fake news” website, 
and about half of these people believed those stories, 
particularly if they favoured their preferred candidate.4
Another example comes from a recent report on 
planetary health, which recommended reducing 
excessive meat and dairy consumption to tackle the 
burden of disease and emissions. A small pro-meat 
countermovement rapidly evolved on social media  
(under the banner yes2meat), with some posts containing 
misinformation and even conspiracy theories or personal 
attacks. The number of tweets and links related to 
yes2meat rivalled those about the original report.5
Of course, social 
media can also spread 
evidence-based 
information and support 
societal goals. Some 
children are fighting 
back against anti-
vaxxers, for example, 
by scouring the internet 
for reliable vaccination 
information and sharing 
it on social media. 
Swedish student Greta 
Thunberg’s school strike 
for the climate became 
a global movement 
driven by online 
engagement through 
#FridaysForFuture and 
based on a simple 
appeal to rationality, 
“unite behind the 
science”. Social media 
has been credited  
with a rise in awareness  
of ocean plastics.  
And, following the  
Notre Dame fire,  
and the rapid response from philanthropists, a 
#SaveThisCathedral hashtag emerged to highlight 
environmental commons such as the Amazon rainforest 
or Greenland ice sheet as other “cathedrals”. 
These changes to the media landscape come at a 
critical time – there is an urgent need for greenhouse 
gas emissions to fall precipitously in the next decade 
(see chapter “Climate”), driven by a dramatic economic 
transformation (see chapter “Transformation”). Digital 
information technologies and media, though messy, 
could support global action, through, for example, 
supporting a shared worldview based on scientific 
evidence. Yet it remains unclear whether information 
technologies will drive earth towards a pandemic  
or away from it; towards a destabilized climate  
or a potentially manageable 1.5°C warmer world. 
Undermining trust
Since the 18th century Enlightenment, democratic 
nations have established complex interconnected 
systems linking the rule of law, due process, and 
systems of checks and balances, to support stable, 
fairer, democratic societies. All pervasive in this  
system, though little acknowledged, is the principle  
that reliable, unbiased information allowing a widely 
shared, defensible description of reality is essential  
to functional and fair governance. Along with science,  
the news media is central to this. 
Many mainstream print media outlets spent time and 
money establishing a reputation for accuracy with high 
ethical standards cementing their role as a guard dog  
for society, so that consumers would go to them for 
trusted news. 
Now, digital upstarts are bypassing or destroying 
many of the checks and balances established for print 
media. Anyone can broadcast with few or no financial 
or editorial constraints. In today’s digital world, 65% of 
consumers’ news content is discovered through search, 
social media, or other serendipitous routes, rather than 
through direct targeting of a particular, trusted media 
outlet.6 In some ways, the utility of being a trusted brand 
has been undercut. In the future, the voices of Siri, 
Alexa, and Google will further distance the audience  
from the sources of information, limiting exposure  
to just single, potentially untrustworthy sources.
It is too simplistic, however, to blame social media for 
all of today’s toxic confusion about information. In the 
1980s, US president Reagan swept aside regulations 
forbidding ownership of TV stations and newspapers in 
the same market. This allowed Rupert Murdoch’s media 
empire to grow fast, gaining unprecedented influence 
over political events in the United States. Reagan then 
disposed of the Fairness Doctrine, which had forced 
TV and radio companies to present both sides of 
contentious policy debates. Shortly afterwards,  
Fox News landed on the airwaves, marketed directly  
at US conservatives.
The result today is a highly divided media landscape –  
particularly in the United States. Liberals and 
conservatives inhabit entirely different media worlds, 
relying on sources with few overlaps: the right-wing  
Fox News and Breitbart have little that connects them 
with the rest of the media, relying on anger and fear 
to drive up readership of their stories. In this alt-reality 
ecosystem a statement doesn’t have to be proved as 
true, just established as dominant.
Social media has deepened this divide. Although the 
serendipitous route by which people arrive at their news 
might be expected to broaden people’s exposure to 
different ideas, much of the time people are bounced 
around the parts of the media landscape that already 
match their mindset: an echo chamber that reinforces 
what they already believe. Social media platforms tend 
to create a uniform look for all information, reducing any 
sense of where it originated or the trustworthiness of 
that source.
Facebook's Mark Zuckerberg giving testimony before  
the House Financial Services Committee in Washington D.C.  
in October 2019.
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According to the 2018 World Press Freedom Index 
report, more and more democratically elected leaders 
“no longer see the media as part of democracy’s 
essential underpinning, but as an adversary to which  
they openly display their aversion”. The 2018 book  
How Democracies Die 6 argues that a main giveaway  
of a leader with authoritarian tendencies is how he or 
she treats media criticism and freedom of the press.
Together, political and technological changes are eroding 
public trust in the media around the world. According  
to a Reuters report,7 public concern about disinformation 
remains high: about half of respondents agreed that they 
trust the news media they themselves use, but across  
all countries trust in the news on average fell to 42%;  
in France, perhaps spurred by media coverage of the 
populist yellow vest protests against rising fuel prices, 
media trust plummeted to 24%. In some nations, 
including Brazil, the United States, and the United 
Kingdom, more than two-thirds of people said they were 
concerned about what was real and fake on the internet.
The reassuring news is that public trust in news  
found via search and social media is significantly  
(and justifiably) lower than trust in traditional media. 
Across countries, over a quarter of people said they  
have started turning to more “reputable” news sources.
Warped democracies
The changing media landscape does not explain the  
rise of populism around the world: global austerity,  
rising inequality, and a sense that the “elites” have 
abandoned large swathes of society, are more likely 
drivers of resentment (see chapter “Politics”).
But the seismic shift in information flow has allowed for 
novel political responses. More radical left- and right-wing 
policies – from the Extinction Rebellion to draconian 
immigration policies – have found an audience. And the 
shift allows movements like the Arab Spring to swell 
rapidly and cross borders. Social media even opens the 
door a crack to new systems of governance: for example, 
direct representation or global democracy.
The new media landscape is ripe for political manipulation. 
The Russian government invests in disinformation 
campaigns to reduce trust in democratic institutions 
throughout Europe and the United States – with the  
goal of leaving Russia standing stronger at the end.8  
The direct impact of such campaigns on elections thus  
far seems limited: a study of millions of tweets from  
a Russian troll factory, for example, found no evidence 
that they had large-scale impacts on political behaviour, 
but they sow confusion and undermine trust, another goal 
of the Russian government. The media and researchers 
are keeping a keen eye on new media’s influence on the 
upcoming 2020 US presidential election.
Not everyone, of course, is yet online to see such 
campaigns. Internet penetration in the United States  
and Europe is extremely high (typically higher than 90%), 
but elsewhere the numbers are, for now, much lower 
(see map “Rates of Connection”). In Central Africa,  
only 12% of people have access. In many regions of  
the Global South, the main issue around digitalization  
is often exclusion. In Malawi, for instance, a data bundle 
of 10GB costs over US$20, but three out of four people 
live on less than US$2 per day. Not having digital access 
doesn’t just limit access to information; it also prevents 
the development of digital literacy skills and prevents  
a sense of digital belonging.
Things are changing  
fast, however. In 2019, 
India alone saw nearly  
98 million new users 
come online (more  
than a quarter of  
the global growth). 
China, Facebook, 
Google, Amazon, and 
Elon Musk are now 
competing to provide 
greater internet access 
across Africa through 
various programmes. 
While these efforts may 
prove successful at 
quickly boosting access, 
they also threaten to limit 
which sites people can 
access most easily, or 
to monopolize consumer 
and citizen data.
As connectivity rises, 
some worrying signals 
are emerging. In 2019, 
at least 10 African 
countries enacted 
internet shutdowns 
before or during 
elections or protests. 
The governments 
usually say this is to 
help maintain safety and 
security; others maintain 
it is being done to restrict access to information and 
prevent movements from challenging leadership.
Social media is being co-opted by authoritarian regimes. 
According to a report from the Computational Propaganda 
Research Project,9 conducted by Oxford University, the 
online world is being used as a tool of information control 
in 26 countries to suppress fundamental human rights, 
discredit political opponents, and drown out dissenting 
opinions. In China, the communist government has 
invested in a sophisticated mass surveillance system 
to track people’s movements using data from phones, 
vehicles, and identity cards – a practice that is being 
targeted specifically at Muslim ethnic minorities in 
China’s Xinjiang region. China has banned western social 
media sites, allowing the China-based app WeChat to 
dominate chat, banking, shopping, and travel. WeChat  
has blocked large discussions of politically charged topics, 
for example relating to the Tiananmen Square massacre  
in 1989 or Hong Kong’s recent protests. It remains 
unclear to what extent the Chinese government has 
access to WeChat data. In early 2019, India floated 
new proposals to suppress internet content, prompting 
comparisons to Chinese censorship.
Surveillance technology using some sort of artificial 
intelligence (AI), is spreading worldwide. At least 
75 countries are actively using AI technologies for 
surveillance, including “smart cities”, facial recognition, 
and “smart policing” 
according to a report 
from the Carnegie 
Endowment for 
International Peace.10 
Chinese companies 
supply AI surveillance 
technology to 63 
countries, 36 of which 
are part of China’s Belt 
and Road Initiative. 
Rebuilding trust
Until very recently, 
the dominant societal 
narratives about 
technology have been 
driven by tech founders 
themselves, and largely 
unquestioned by 
politicians and the  
media. Companies 
like Facebook 
and Google have 
propelled a narrative 
that technological 
development is 
inevitable, and that  
their services will  
help to unite humanity 
and make information 
more useful. Yet,  
in reality, information 
technologies are 
undermining democracies, sowing distrust in the media, 
and ultimately threatening social cohesion at a critical 
moment for global cooperation on sustainability.
The broad societal discussion about the role of the 
technology platforms in supporting societal goals is 
nascent. Politicians are figuring out how to navigate 
this new world, and the research community is just 
beginning to engage. Future Earth created an initiative, 
“Sustainability in the Digital Age”, to bring together 
academics and leading tech companies to explore 
a research agenda to expand this conversation. 
Elsewhere, the German Advisory Council on Global 
Change and The World in 2050 are exploring the role  
of digitalization in future low-emissions pathways. 
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collection must be declared, and collectors must state 
how long the data is being retained and who it will be 
shared with. In July 2019, German authorities in the 
state of Hesse banned the use of Microsoft’s popular 
cloud Office 365 services in schools, citing privacy 
concerns and potential exposure of student data to 
American authorities. In the same month in the United 
States, Facebook was fined $5 billion by the Federal 
Trade Commission for privacy violations.
Power play
A century ago, rail and telephone companies were 
broken apart under anti-trust and monopoly legislation 
to reduce concentrations of power. In recent decades, 
the definition of a monopoly has focused on protecting 
consumers from high prices. Since digital platforms 
often provide services for free, they have slipped under 
the monopoly radar. In 2017, the European Commission 
fined Google €2.42 billion after it found the giant’s 
promotion of its own price comparison service over that 
of its rivals illegal. The case began in 2010, highlighting 
the complexity of bringing these types of cases before 
the courts. Since April 2019, new EU rules force Google 
and Amazon to tell companies how they rank products 
on their platforms. 
Some politicians, including Democrat presidential 
candidate Elizabeth Warren, are now calling for the  
tech giants to be split up, arguing that their power  
and dominance is bad for democracy. Decentralization 
and more competition should help constrain the power 
of any one company, but there could be negative impacts 
too. As more companies enter the market, they may 
try to gain an edge over their competitors by using 
even more biased algorithms to promote even more 
emotionally charged content, driving greater polarization. 
Nick Srnicek, a lecturer in digital economy at King’s 
College London, has argued that these platforms 
operate more like utilities, providing essential services 
for societies – from online shopping to communications 
and banking. As such, Srnicek argues, they should  
be regulated to support the common good rather than 
profit. This might mean shifting ownership of online 
platforms away from private companies.
There is no obvious consensus on how to harness the 
power of platforms to support societal goals. But it is 
clear that a transformation to a sustainable planet needs 
three things: a shared acknowledgement of the need 
to act; trust in collective decision-making; and a system 
to support behavioural change. Our globally connected 
digital ecosystems can support these aims, but this 
presents the need for a new social contract between 
technology and society – Tim Berners Lee, the founder of 
the world wide web, recently proposed something similar.
The biggest opportunity from the digital revolution 
may not be the development of an internet of things, 
biotech, or even artificial intelligence, but rather the tools 
to distinguish fact from fiction – and to harness new 
digital media for the good.
The emerging solutions tend to group around three 
areas: learning to live in this new information ecosystem; 
self-regulation by information platforms; and more 
effective government oversight.
Research is accumulating on how to inoculate people 
against fake news, online propaganda, and misinformation. 
The Cambridge Social Decision-Making Lab created  
an online game “Bad News” that allows people to 
spread conspiracy theories in a safe environment. 
Results of their study involving 15,000 users showed 
that playing the game helped create “mental antibodies” 
to false information.11
Other research has shown that it is easier to replace false 
ideas in people’s minds if an alternative is provided.12 
Saying the MMR vaccination does not cause autism,  
for example, is less persuasive than offering an alternative 
explanation for an apparent rise in diagnoses. Those 
attempting to counter the rising tide of fake news can use 
these emerging tools to help improve the effectiveness  
of their messaging.
Several fact-check companies now patrol WhatsApp, 
sometimes with funding from the International Fact-
Checking Network, to help to flag incorrect information. 
The bigger goal though, is to prevent it from circulating 
in the first place. Leading tech companies are beginning 
to acknowledge that misinformation is a problem and are 
rolling out solutions ranging from cracking down on fake 
accounts, to policing search engine page rankings. 
In 2019, WhatsApp announced it would limit the number 
of times a message could be forwarded to five,  
in an attempt to stop provocative content from spreading 
(although initial research suggests this is ineffective 
at blocking misinformation campaigns).13 Google has 
rewritten its algorithms to elevate search results that 
are judged (by Google) to be in-depth original reporting 
requiring “a high degree of skill, time and effort”. 
Facebook has created an independent oversight body 
to adjudicate over content moderation and announced 
a series of measures to prevent election interference, 
ranging from anti-hacking protections to labelling  
state-owned media and removing campaigns from,  
for example, Russia and Iran. At the same time, though, 
the company exempts political adverts from fact-
checking, while Twitter recently banned political adverts 
on its platform.
Governments have been slow to react to these issues; 
indeed, some are often complicit in data surveillance 
of citizens, or eager recipients of the collected data. 
Now, tech companies are increasingly facing antitrust, 
anti-competition, and privacy legislation. As lawmakers 
deliberate, tech companies are pouring money into 
lobbyists to influence the regulatory agenda. 
While the United States remains cautious about 
regulating the industry, in 2018 Europe clamped down 
harder than any other region on data privacy with new 
laws that give people more control over personal data. 
Europeans now have the right to be forgotten. Under 
the General Data Protection Regulation, personal data 
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In 2018, the world's last male northern 
white rhino died in his Kenyan enclosure. 
The Brazilian blue parrot, Spix’s Macaw, 
was declared extinct in the wild, among 
a handful of other birds. A 2019 study 
showed bird populations across North 
America have declined a staggering 29% 
since the 1970s.1 And those are just the 
things that grabbed the media’s attention 
or scientists’ notice.
In May 2019, scientists 
released the most 
comprehensive report 
yet produced on the 
status of and trends in 
biodiversity, ecosystem 
services, and their links 
to human well-being. 
The news from that 
Intergovernmental 
Science-Policy Platform 
on Biodiversity and 
Ecosystem Services 
(IPBES) report isn’t 
good.2 Humans have 
now “significantly 
altered” 75% of our 
planet’s land area and 
66% of the ocean. 
More than 85% 
of wetlands have 
been lost. The report 
estimates that about  
a quarter of species  
in assessed plant  
and animal groups are 
threatened: that means 
about 1 million species 
face possible extinction, 
perhaps within decades. 
The rate of extinction 
is currently tens to 
hundreds of times 
higher than the average 
over the last 10 million 
years. Since 50,000 
years ago, the mass  
of wild mammals on  
the planet has declined 
by a factor of six:3 today, 
the mass of domesticated livestock and poultry vastly 
outweighs that of wild animals and birds.
Around the world, biological communities are becoming 
more and more similar to each other – whether those 
ecosystems are managed by humans or not. In the 
last 60 years, according to the United Nations Food and 
Agriculture Organization, wheat, maize, and rice have 
become the main staple foods across the globe, replacing 
traditional crops like cassava, yam, millet, and sorghum, 
and leading to a loss of 90% of crop varieties. Invasive 
species like African grasses have wiped out local species 
and made one ecosystem more like another.
This is not just a philosophical or moral problem: these 
profound changes to the fabric of life have considerable 
impacts on human well-being. Ecosystems provide us 
with resources for fuel, medicine, food, and clean water, 
all of which depend on complex, biodiverse systems for 
their healthy maintenance. About three quarters of food 
crops, including cash crops like coffee, rely on animals 
for their pollination, for example. Yet recent years have 
seen a 75% decline in insect abundance, including 
pollinators.4 The very  
soil that we use to grow 
our food has seen  
a decline of 10–15%  
in organic content over 
the last decades.5
In 2010, parties to the 
Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD) adopted 
the Strategic Plan  
for Biodiversity 2011–
2020, and its 20 Aichi 
Biodiversity Targets,  
to halt biodiversity loss. 
Despite increasing calls 
to conserve biodiversity, 
it is very unlikely that 
most if not all of these 
targets will be reached 
by 2020, jeopardizing 
the achievement 
of the Sustainable 
Development Goals  
by 2030.
Countries are now in the 
process of negotiating 
a “Global Deal for 
Nature”: a new global 
biodiversity framework 
to be discussed through 
the CBD in 2020. The 
development of the 
post-2020 strategic plan 
for the CBD provides  
a critical opportunity to 
set out a new ambitious 
plan of actions to 
conserve and restore 
global biodiversity.6 
Fulfilling this goal –  
and reversing the trends of loss of life on this planet –  
will require some new ways of thinking about conservation.
Known unknowns
The IPBES extinction estimate is based on well-studied 
species that are obvious (like mammals and birds)  
or of particular interest to society or science (like  
rare, ancient seed plants called cycads). A lot less  
is known about many other species, some of which  
are, undoubtedly, vitally important to ecosystems.
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Cumulative percentage of species extinctions, based on background rate 
of 0.1–2 extinctions per million species per year. Source: IPBES, 2019. 
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Very little is known about invertebrate species, 
for example: soil invertebrates are not included in 
assessments, and changes in invertebrate diversity 
often go unnoticed.7 Invertebrates are thought to 
be experiencing even more rapid change than other 
groups, thanks to their short lifespan and complex life 
cycles; many species may even go extinct before their 
discovery. Yet invertebrates are central to the functioning 
of a wide range of ecosystems – the majority of 
pollinators are insects, for example, and invertebrates 
living in the soil are crucial for nutrient cycling. Their 
disappearance has direct impacts on food security.
Even less is known about microorganisms or microbes, 
which make up the majority of life on earth. These occur in 
virtually all habitats and are fundamental to biogeochemical 
cycles and the health of plants and animals.
Microorganisms, in particular phytoplankton, soak up  
a huge amount of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere 
and play an important role in the carbon cycle. Soil 
microbial diversity is important for plant health and plant 
growth, and researchers know that plant diversity has  
a positive effect on soil microbial diversity (likewise  
a decline in plant diversity leads to a decline in microbe 
diversity).8 Researchers know that climate change and 
land-use changes affect the function and composition of 
microbial communities9 – the diversity of soil microbes 
decreases as conditions get hotter and drier, for example – 
but the exact details of what we are doing to our 
planet’s microbes, and the long-term impacts of that,  
are unclear.
Researchers know from studies at small to large 
scales that a decline in the number of species reduces 
ecosystem function, and an increase boosts it. To be 
specific, in grasslands, an increase in the total number 
of species increases the sheer mass of plant material 
that grows in any given time: more species means  
more productivity.10 In sub-tropical forests, the amount 
of carbon soaked up by plant life is higher in stands  
with a greater number of tree species.11
A decline in the number of species, and a homogenization 
of ecological communities, reduces ecosystems’  
function in many ways, from the total amount of growth 
to resistance to invasive species. This effect has been  
seen in grasslands sites across five continents.12
In the driver’s seat
What’s causing all this biodiversity loss and its knock-
on effects? The IPBES report identifies five main direct 
drivers. First, there are changes in how humans use the 
land and sea, such as the conversion of vast swathes  
of forests to agriculture – between 2000 and 2010,  
the planet lost some 1.5 million sq km of global forest.13 
Second, the direct exploitation of organisms: raw timber 
harvesting, for example, has gone up by 45% since 
1970. Third, climate change: coral reefs, for example,  
are vulnerable to heat stress and ocean acidification,  
and are expected to decline 10–30% with 1.5°C  
of warming. Fourth, pollution: algal bloom in lakes,  
for example, can wipe out other resident species.  
And finally, the invasion of alien species: zebra mussels, 
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Potential for Protection
Amongst the world’s 846 terrestrial ecoregions (A), there are variable potentials for reaching a target of 30% protection by 2030 (B).  
In this assessment, 219 of the regions have already met a target of 30% protection; 347 have high potential for reaching this target 
(given the amount of land already protected plus the amount of remaining land with potential for protection); 88 have moderate 
potential; and 192 are imperiled. The ecoregions that have or could reach 30% protection are distributed among all of the 14 terrestrial 
biomes. Source: Dinerstein et al. 2019
infamously, are outcompeting and threatening dozens  
of other species of freshwater mussels in places including  
the Great Lakes of North America.
Underpinning these direct drivers are indirect effects.  
As humanity changes its patterns of consumption,  
for example, different patches of land are converted to 
agriculture and different shipping routes are established. 
Government policies intended to do one thing, like 
boosting agricultural production, often end up harming 
biodiversity. These drivers do not work in isolation:  
they interact with each other, and the impacts of combined 
drivers are often bigger than the sum of their parts.
In part because of all this complexity, it is hard to predict 
how ecosystems will change in response to factors 
like climate change. The current models that predict 
large-scale alterations to vegetation patterns in the face 
of climate change, like the expansion of boreal forests 
into Arctic tundra, can’t predict the actual species-level 
changes to plant communities on a smaller scale. On a 
local scale, other things are more important, from the 
type of soil to the presence or absence of herbivores 
and pollinators.14
Seeking solutions
Addressing the challenges linked to a deteriorating  
web of life and the consequences for human well-being 
requires urgent action that tackles the root causes  
of environmental decline.
The traditional approaches to conservation are unlikely 
to work by themselves: creating an isolated protected 
area, for example, or working to conserve one single 
species, may ignore the complex interrelations between 
ecosystems and social patterns across huge scales.
The future of biodiversity conservation will have to take 
into account all the direct and indirect human drivers  
of biodiversity loss, from economics to governance,  
as outlined by IPBES, and also needs to consider  
“tele-coupling”: the impact of local decisions and 
actions on other parts of the world.
There are plenty of examples of local decisions that 
seemed to make sense but had negative effects 
elsewhere. In the early 2000s for example, European 
countries made a big push to increase biofuels in order  
to reduce CO2 emissions from transport. 
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But this contributed to an increase in palm oil and 
sugar cane plantations, in part to meet these demands, 
resulting in mass deforestation in Indonesia and 
Malaysia – it has been estimated that 45% of palm oil 
expansion since 2008 has been at the expense of forest. 
In March 2019, after years of controversy, the European 
Commission concluded that palm oil biofuel shouldn’t  
be eligible for renewable transport targets.
Likewise, restrictions on logging in one area have  
led to booms elsewhere; restrictions on fish catches 
in one place have boosted catches, and problematic 
bycatches, elsewhere.
The new goal is to establish targets that are useful  
and relevant both locally and globally; and to “decouple” 
economic growth and improvements to standards of 
living from environmental degradation and unsustainable 
resource use.
The proposed solutions are varied. There are 
suggestions, for example, to keep the food system 
within environmental limits by encouraging dietary 
changes: it seems possible to feed more people a 
healthy diet, using less land, by relying less on meat  
and dairy products and more on vegetables and grains.15 
This approach has several benefits: it frees up land  
for conservation, reduces CO2 emissions and pollution, 
and also improves human health (see chapter “Food”).
To address land degradation more broadly, wider 
initiatives are being developed. The United Nations 
Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) aims  
to achieve Land Degradation Neutrality, for example,  
by counterbalancing loss of productive land with 
recovery of degraded lands elsewhere. For example, 
the Great Green Wall Initiative has the stated intent 
of restoring millions of hectares of degraded land in 
the Sahel region of Africa. Other initiatives are gaining 
momentum, such as the Coalition of the Willing on 
Pollinators, which aims to promote sustainable land 
use supportive of pollinators. These efforts contribute 
to the protection of biodiversity and ecosystems, while 
simultaneously increasing food security, and securing 
local and national economies.
Land use remains a huge challenge: the competition 
between land use for food, biodiversity, and biofuels  
has many knock-on effects on greenhouse gases,  
human welfare, health, and more. One possible solution 
is to rely more on lifestyle changes to reduce energy 
demand, and the reduction of non-CO2 greenhouse 
gases, to keep climate change in check.16
Yet it is also true that conserving ecosystems is an 
extremely effective way to stabilize the climate while 
also protecting biodiversity and human health. The Global 
Deal for Nature being negotiated now aims to deliver a 
deal to protect and restore 50% of the world’s land and 
oceans by 2050, with an initial target to bring 30% under 
protection by 2030. The effort has divided the earth up 
into about 1,000 different ecoregions, from tropical forest 
to tundra, to work out which regions are already well 
preserved, and which need the most urgent attention 
(Figure: Potential for Protection). Conserving half of our 
planet is an ambitious target that is expected to save 
the majority of species and help make the planet more 
liveable for humanity – at an estimated cost of about 
US$100 billion per year.17
Keeping the web of life from unravelling, and meeting 
the environmental and societal goals for the next 
decades, requires rapid action that addresses the 
challenges synergistically and in a concerted fashion. 
We need to address the root causes of environmental 
destruction, transforming society and governance,  
and rethink our values.   
T H E  L O n G  V I E W
The drivers of biodiversity change aren’t exactly new; 
climate change is a constant, and Homo sapiens 
have been around for more than 300,000 years.
As early as 125,000 years ago,18 people 
contributed to the Late-Pleistocene megafaunal 
extinctions: a combination of climate change  
and hunting led to the extinction of many  
large mammals on virtually every continent,  
from the woolly mammoth to cave bear and  
sabre-toothed cat. That was perhaps humankind’s 
first major alteration of ecosystem structure,  
with long-term legacy effects on plant communities 
and fire regimes. Some 50,000 years ago,  
humans in Australia burnt large tracts of grasslands, 
reducing shrubs and trees, and increasing grassland 
productivity. In Southern Africa, hunter-gatherers 
used fire to promote edible plant species,  
and pastoralists burned grasslands to improve 
grazing for their herds.
In Europe, deforestation began as early as 6,000 
years ago, as people made room for agriculture. 
Hunter-gathers, farmers, and pastoralists began 
to have truly significant impacts on land use by 
about 3,000 years ago, when ancient Greece  
was in full swing.19 Trees were felled and burned  
to make way for more and more people until the 
end of the Industrial Revolution.
This long-term view is important for understanding 
the history of an ecosystem, the likely impacts of 
future human-induced changes on the biosphere, 
and the extent to which altered ecosystems can 
cope with future climate changes – all of which 
contributes to what conservation efforts might  
aim to achieve.
On the Galapagos islands, for example, 
conservationists are keenly worried about the 
detrimental impacts of some 750 non-native 
plants introduced over about 500 years of human 
habitation. But a study of fossil pollen dating back 
5,000 years proved that six suspect plants were 
actually old natives making a comeback.20
Other studies help to show which ecosystems 
might prove stable, and which might require 
management. At the tail end of the last ice age, 
some 14,000 years ago, North American ash  
and spruce occurred in the same habits; today, 
their ranges do not overlap.21 A swathe of such 
studies can help to show which species can 
happily coexist, even if they don’t do so today.
Studies of the past extent of forests and deserts 
inform the models that tell us what vegetation  
to expect in a warmer future, or how much fire  
we might see in a warmer world.22 The long  
view tells us to expect boreal forests to expand 
polewards and to be replaced by more drought-
adapted species in southern regions.
Interestingly, the palaeoecological record is also 
revealing an increasing number of examples of 
species and ecosystems that were surprisingly 
resilient to higher temperatures and increased 
levels of CO2.
23 The most common response 
to past periods of fast warming was actually 
a replacement of plant biomes rather than 
extinctions. That isn’t necessarily good news  
for the future, however. Today’s ecosystems are 
being affected by a rapidly warming climate while 
also being heavily degraded by human activities. 
That adds uncertainties to the end effect.
Image from an investigative report from Rainforest Action Network that presents 
evidence of two undisclosed palm oil plantations in West Kalimantan, Indonesia.
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In 2019, the world saw the first ever 
climate-change-related bankruptcy.  
The owner of California’s largest electric 
utility company, PG&E, filed for bankruptcy 
in January, after their equipment 
was blamed for sparking California’s 
devastating Camp Fire, which devoured 
more than 150,000 acres and took more 
than 85 lives in the summer of 2018. 
Transmission lines may have created the 
spark, but climate change amplified the 
hot, dry conditions that left vegetation 
vulnerable to fire. Climate change,  
many say, was partly to blame.
Finance is a risky business. But the global situation  
today – economic, political, and environmental,  
especially climate change – is conspiring to make it riskier.
We live in a “full” world 
with at least 7.3 billion 
people, which has seen 
explosive financial 
growth over the past  
50 years. From 1970–
2018, global GDP grew 
from under US$3 trillion 
to US$80 trillion; and 
global debt skyrocketed 
from 35% to 290% of 
GDP.1 At the same time, 
the growth in wealth has 
been skewed towards 
just a tiny fraction of  
the global population, 
leading to huge 
economic inequality. 
Today, less than 1%  
of the population owns 
over 50% of economic 
assets, nearly 20% of 
the world lives in poverty, 
and much of the “middle 
classes” have not seen 
real improvement in their economic condition for several 
decades.2 These economic inequalities spawn financial, 
social, and political risks.
But climate and environmental change has perhaps 
the biggest impact on financial risk today. The number 
and severity of extreme weather events and natural 
disasters is rising, at huge cost – and poorer people 
who depend on nature for their livelihood suffer most 
from these changes in natural systems.3 The transition 
to an economy powered by renewables brings great 
opportunities, but also great risks to companies 
currently invested in fossil fuels. Global disturbances 
to biodiversity, along with the carbon, nitrogen, and 
phosphorous cycles, have deep and not-well-understood 
impacts on societies and food production, which in turn 
brings economic risk.
Fortunately, there are a few efforts under way to better 
document, manage, and reduce these risks, including 
the nascent Task Force on Climate-related Financial 
Disclosures (TCFD). But there is still a very long way to go.
While the impact of earth system changes on finance  
is huge, the impact of finance on the earth system  
is also immense and growing. The great acceleration  
of economic growth over the 20th century put a lot  
of pressure on the earth system, emphasizing resource 
extraction and profits over sustainability. In recent 
decades, ecological economists have highlighted the 
grave risk posed by economic growth on ecosystem 
health. Today, financial products like green bonds – 
and a trend towards 
environmental, social, 
and governance  
(ESG) investing –  
will hopefully begin to 
reverse this trend and 
instead promote more 
sustainable activities.
In 2018, the United 
Nations estimated 
that there is an annual 
investment gap of 
US$2.5 trillion to meet 
global sustainable 
development goals. 
Public funds won’t 
be enough to close 
this gap: mobilizing 
private finance is 
key. Guidelines for 
sustainable investing, 
along with products  
like green bonds, 
can help financial 
investment to drive the planet towards, rather than 
away from, sustainability.
Rising climate risk
As the PG&E bankruptcy shows, climate change is 
bringing significant financial risk to the business world. 
Scientists have long been warning about this. Insurance 
companies were among the first in the financial sector 
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A search and rescue team rakes through remains of the 
devastating Camp Fire in Paradise, California in November 2018.
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to take the message on board, as extreme events  
like floods and droughts ramped up and caused more 
insured losses. A recent survey by three actuarial 
organizations found that insurers now name climate 
change as the top risk for their industry.4
Central banks and business leaders are sitting up and 
paying attention. In April 2019, the Bank of England’s 
governor Mark Carney (along with the Network for 
Greening the Financial Services, a coalition of central 
banks formed at the One Planet Summit in Paris in 
2017), penned an open letter. It hammered home the 
importance of climate-related financial risks and what 
needs to be done to manage them. Business leaders 
and experts surveyed by the World Economic Forum 
ahead of its annual summit in Davos said that extreme 
weather, failure of climate change mitigation and 
adaptation strategies, and natural disasters are the three 
risks they’re most likely to face in 2019.5 A 2019 report 
from BlackRock affirmed that investors can no longer 
view climate-related risk as something lying far off in  
the future.6
Financial reports often group climate-change-related 
risks into two categories. The first of these, physical 
risk, refers to the problems caused by climate-related 
hazards such as sea-level rise, heatwaves, droughts, 
and extreme weather. These can be sudden, like the 
California wildfires in 2018. They can also be chronic, 
such as sea-level rise and increase in global mean 
surface temperature, as changing climatic conditions 
have knock-on effects on industry.
Climate change is expected to impact the growth of 
coffee, for example. The world’s most popular farmed 
coffee type, Coffea arabica, can only thrive in specific 
climatic conditions. One recent study found that 60%  
of the wild species of coffee are at risk of extinction.7 
This poses a risk to the coffee industry and farmers;  
to the quality, price, and availability of coffee; and 
finally to financiers. Meanwhile, changing patterns of 
hurricanes and storms in South East Asia could disrupt 
the global supply chains of technology companies,  
and increased water scarcity is expected to impact 
beverage companies like Coca-Cola.
The second category is 
transition risks, which refer 
to the risks resulting from 
the transition to a low-carbon 
economy. The development 
of renewable energy and 
electric cars, to name a few 
examples, provide both huge 
opportunity but also risk for the 
companies invested in fossil 
fuel technologies.
Both technological 
development and government 
policies can change rapidly, 
creating uncertainty that adds  
to financial risk. Companies 
might be caught off guard by 
the introduction of a carbon 
tax, for example, or by a new 
regulation that makes a major 
investment in infrastructure 
obsolete – stranding assets, 
and creating financial loss. 
The Norwegian Oil and Gas 
Association recently warned 
that increasing political  
activism could dramatically  
hit its nation’s largest industry. 
A study by the European 
Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Authority (EIOPA) 
found that 10–13% of European 
insurers’ assets are exposed to 
climate transition risk.8
Pricing the problem
The BlackRock report concluded 
that climate risks are likely not 
being correctly priced by the 
market. The report notes that it seems to be hard for 
investors to grasp the realities of how climate change 
will impact their portfolio, for two reasons: the tendency 
of financial markets to underprice risks that seem low 
probability and distant; and lack of data and tools.6
Lending and investment decisions are often made  
on short-time horizons, typically less than 10 years,  
while the time horizons presented in climate change 
studies are usually 20–30 years or much more, 
sometimes centuries. This means that investors are 
encouraged to act in ways that promote short-term 
returns at the expense of long-term planning. The EU 
Sustainable Finance Action Plan, adopted in 2018, 
acknowledges this as one of the key barriers to a 
sustainable finance system. The plan details strategies 
to foster long-termism in governance – along with other 
steps to foster sustainability.
In the meantime, a lack of solid, public information on 
climate risks remains a problem. A recent review of 
investors’ needs for information on physical climate risk, 
for example, revealed that this information is mostly 
provided by consultancies that 
aren’t transparent about their 
methods and provide limited 
public accessibility to their 
underlying data.9 A common 
truism in business is that you 
cannot manage what you  
do not measure; climate risk  
is no different.
One of the best-known efforts 
aiming to close this gap is the 
TCFD, established in 2015  
by the Financial Stability Board 
at the request of the G20.  
The TCFD developed a set  
of recommendations to 
streamline the disclosure  
of climate-related financial 
risk by all financial actors and 
companies, explicitly creating 
a framework for climate risk 
to become a part of standard 
financial reporting. This has 
massively raised awareness in 
the financial community about 
how climate risk translates into 
financial risk, and has given 
the community a common 
language to talk about it.
As of 2019, 340 global investors 
managing nearly US$34 trillion 
are asking companies to  
report in line with the TCFD.  
A recent survey by S&P  
Global found that of the largest 
2,500 companies in the world, 
70% have at least limited TCFD 
filings.10 But fully fledged TCFD 
reporting has been slow to start. 
The TCFD recently published  
a review of climate-related financial disclosures over three 
years for over 1,000 companies.11 The review found that 
while disclosure has increased, the level of disclosure  
is still insufficient for investors.
There are a number of frameworks and guidelines for 
tackling even broader sustainability risks, beyond just 
climate. For example, the Sustainability Accounting 
Standards Board sets some voluntary guidelines for 
transparent reporting to investors. The EU Sustainable 
Finance Action Plan includes an update of the 2014 EU 
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directive on the disclosure of non-financial information, 
which requires large companies to disclose material ESG 
risks and how these risks are managed. The proposed 
updated guidance to companies includes reporting in line 
with the TCFD recommendations.
But for reporting companies and their investors,  
it remains a hard task to assess and disclose these risks. 
There are many overlapping guidelines and initiatives 
at international, national, and regional levels. When the 
Center for International Climate and Environmental 
Research (CICERO) interviewed Norwegian financial-
sector stakeholders in 2018, they found “reporting 
fatigue” was common among respondents.12
The availability of data on climate-related financial risks  
is expected to get better with improved corporate 
reporting efforts like the TCFD, and there are a myriad 
of new tools emerging for the investment community. 
Several major rating companies and specialized ESG 
providers offer climate-risk datasets, for example.  
The current offerings are not considered adequate  
by all investors, but there are emerging initiatives  
by research institutes to bridge this gap. An example 
is the CICERO-led initiative to categorize corporate 
revenue and investments according to how aligned  
they are with a low-carbon, climate-resilient future.13
Driving sustainable finance
The good news is that sustainable finance – the notion 
of using investments and financial instruments to create 
a more sustainable earth system – has recently grown 
from niche to mainstream.
The Principles for Responsible Investment, for example, 
launched in 2006, now has more than 2,000 signatories 
in the financial sector. This body, which was started by 
the United Nations but is now a stand-alone effort, lays 
out good principles for ESG investing, helping investors 
to target projects that encourage everything from 
environmental sustainability to ethical working conditions.
Within the ESG universe there are many different 
investment strategies. A commonly used strategy among 
ESG investors is to exclude companies with poor ESG 
performance from their portfolios. In 2019, the Norwegian 
pension fund excluded several companies for being overly 
invested in coal, or for serious violations of human rights.
Another ESG strategy goes further, screening all 
companies in a portfolio for factors like carbon emissions 
or gender equality, and considering those criteria in 
addition to financial performance. One such example  
is Generation Investment Management, which announced 
in 2019 a US$1 billion fund specifically to invest  
in the themes of planetary health, human health,  
and financial inclusion.
Some studies now suggest that ESG investing decreases 
financial risks for lenders and investors. A 2015 review of 
2,000 empirical studies found that the majority of them 
report a positive relationship between ESG and corporate 
financial performance.14 A more recent study in China 
found that allocating more green loans to a loan portfolio 
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reduced the share of loans in, or close to, default.15  
This suggests that green loans may be less risky than 
non-green loans.
In addition to considering sustainability in existing financial 
products, there is a growing world of sustainable finance 
instruments. The sustainable debt market, for example, 
consists of bonds (tradable debt) that have a green and/
or social purpose. This is a voluntary market driven by 
investor demand for sustainable debt. The market reached 
US$247 billion of issuance in 2018.16 Sustainable bonds 
still represent just a few per cent of all bonds (the entire 
debt market is not well documented, so the total figure  
is unknown). But the market is increasing dramatically, 
more than doubling from 2016 to 2018.
The biggest and most mature part of the sustainable 
debt market is “green bonds”, with about US$182 billion 
of issuance in 2018.16 These finance a broad range of 
environmental activities, from green buildings to wind 
farms, as guided by the voluntary, international Green 
Bond Principles (GBP).
Since the first green bond was issued in 2008 by the 
World Bank, the market for green bonds has expanded 
greatly. Today it is not just multilateral development 
banks that issue green bonds, but also financial 
institutions, municipalities, and national governments.  
In 2018 there were six new sovereign green bonds  
from Belgium, Indonesia, Ireland, Lithuania, Poland,  
and the Seychelles. These sovereign green bonds provide 
funding for important green infrastructure projects.
The first green version of an Islamic bond (sukuk) went 
towards building a 50-MW solar power plant in Malaysia. 
And Indonesia raised US$1.25 billion from a green sukuk 
towards projects including enhancing rapid transit in 
Jakarta, the capital city.
So far, the environmental integrity of the green bond 
market has been maintained mainly by a voluntary 
system of external reviews, such as those carried out by 
CICERO. But several countries are considering regulating 
the market. China, the second biggest national market 
for green bonds, has detailed regulations in place for 
the green bond market; the People’s Bank of China 
published green bond guidelines in 2015. In early 2019, 
the European Commission developed a draft green bond 
standard, building on existing GBP. Increased regulation 
will provide standardization to the green bond market 
but might also increase the barrier to entry if transaction 
costs go up.
The success of the green bond market has spurred  
new products, including social and sustainable bonds 
that incorporate both environmental and social goals.  
So far these are nascent markets, with just shy of 
US$14 billion of social and US$18 billion of sustainability 
bonds issued in 2019.17 But, though just a small slice  
of the pie for now, they have attracted the attention of 
some major players: notable issuers include the City of 
Los Angeles, Starbucks, and the National Bank of Canada.
In 2018 a brand-new product, sustainability-linked loans, 
was introduced and saw substantial issuance – in the 
first year, over US$36 trillion of loans were issued.16 
These debt instruments include incentives for the issuer 
to achieve sustainability goals, tying together ESG and 
financial performance. These products still represent  
a small share of the total debt markets, but their growth 
gives reason for optimism.
The path forwards
In April 2019, the Network for Greening the Financial 
System released its first report,18 laying out suggested 
actions for greening the financial system and for the 
whole financial system to become more resilient to  
the risks inherent to climate and environmental change.
The report recommends integrating climate-related 
financial risks into financial stability monitoring; integrating 
sustainability into central bank portfolio management;  
and bridging data gaps by publicly sharing relevant data. 
It encourages policymakers to promote adoption of the 
TCFD recommendations, along with other internationally 
consistent environmental disclosures. And it supports 
enhancing transparency about both the potential climate 
impact – and the climate risk – of economic activities.
The financial sector has a key role to play in the low-
carbon transition, in reducing vulnerability and in 
strengthening adaptation to the impacts of climate 
change. By financing activities that either fit into a low-
emissions economy or represent a step in that direction, 
the financial sector – along with policy and regulatory 
measures – can help to bring about the necessary 
transformations in a way that reduces climate-
related risks and safeguards economic development. 
Connecting financial decisions to the biosphere and  
the earth system as a whole should help to provide  
a just and sustainable livelihood for all.
There is still a long way to go. But the strategies and 
instruments developed over the past few years provide  
a reason for optimism. As Mark Carney said in a speech 
to the European Commission in March 2019, “In the 
future, climate and ESG considerations will likely be at 
the heart of mainstream investing”. He predicts that better 
corporate reporting and better data analysis – aided by 
the latest artificial intelligence trend of machine learning – 
will help investors to tailor their investments in ways that 
help the planet.
Green Bonds
The number of green bonds has risen dramatically  
in recent years, with a diversity of different issuers.  
Source: Climate Bonds Initiative, 2019
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Today, humanity produces sufficient 
calories, in theory, to feed the 7.7 billion 
people on the planet: the amount of  
food produced per person on the planet  
has gone up more than 40% since the 
1960s. Yet, ironically, the prevalence  
of undernourishment – which had  
been declining for decades – has started  
to tip upwards again: the total number  
of people undernourished in 2018  
stood at more than 820 million people,  
up from a record low of 785 million in  
2015 (see Figure: Hunger rising). At the 
same time, some 1.9 billion people are 
overweight, and 650 million are obese.1
Achieving food security means producing enough 
nutritious food that is safe to eat, affordable, and 
accessible to those in need. Strains on food production 
are expected to increase, as a result of changing  
climate and environments (including biodiversity loss), 
and growing food demand due to population growth.  
By 2050, we will need to feed an estimated 9 billion 
people on a planet with diminished natural resources.
To get food to the right place, networks of food trade  
in our increasingly globalized world will become ever-
more important but their role in global food security  
is a double-edged sword. Global trade can facilitate  
food accessibility and help individuals or nations to pull 
out of poverty; but it can also further deprive the poor. 
The profitabilityof so-called flex crops, which can  
be used as biofuels, has resulted in large investments 
in sub-Saharan Africa, for example, but this also often 
displaces local small-scale farmers who are important 
for local food security. Rapid increases in exports 
of local or indigenous crops can lead to unintended 
consequences such as agricultural expansion into 
marginal lands and desertification, and displacement  
of small-scale farmers. The growing popularity of quinoa 
in Europe and North America, for example, has led to 
an almost doubling of the number of hectares devoted 
to growing this crop in Peru, displacing other crops 
important to local food markets.2
The vulnerability of the current food system has been 
highlighted by recent financial shocks. The global 
economic crash of 2008 resulted in a price hike of 300% 
for rice within a single year, as countries like India closed 
their doors to exports to protect their own population. 
During the past two years of trade-war between the 
United States and China, soya bean prices have been 
volatile, putting a strain on US farmers.
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Hunger Rising
The number of undernourished people in the world has been  
on the rise since 2015, and is back to levels seen in 2010–2011.  
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Meanwhile our current food system is driving the planet 
towards more extreme climates. A quarter of humanity’s 
greenhouse gases come from agricultural land. This 
includes methane released by ruminant livestock and 
paddy rice production, emissions from farm machinery 
or production of agricultural chemicals, and the carbon 
released through deforestation to expand agricultural 
land. Rapid soya bean expansion in Brazil comes at the 
cost of clearing carbon- and biodiversity-rich forests.
The predicted increase in extreme weather events such 
as floods and droughts will hit agriculture hard: in October 
2019, the United Nations World Food Programme warned 
that the drought, cyclones, and floods seen recently in 
Southern Africa will make a record 45 million people 
across 16 nations severely food insecure in the next six 
months. Higher atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) boosts 
some plant productivity but also lowers the nutritional 
content of some crops, which will affect the poorer 
countries disproportionately.3 Most global agricultural 
models predict that the changing climate alone would 
decrease agricultural production; but a possible boost 
in plant productivity from elevated CO2 levels has the 
potential to offset some impacts on yields.
As the world continues to warm, the regions where 
major food and cash crops can grow are shifting,  
placing further strain on traditional food supply networks 
and on communities that rely on marginal lands for  
their own sustenance. The forecast is that the overall 
amount of land suitable for growing crops will stay the 
same, but we will need to squeeze ever more food out 
of that land for our growing population in our changing 
climate.4 The biggest boom in population over the next 
century is expected for sub-Saharan Africa, in areas 
often unsuitable for intensive agriculture due to poor  
soil quality and scarce water resources.
As well as contributing to climate change, the way we 
produce our food has other serious consequences for 
the environment and the livelihoods of people growing 
our food. Our current food system causes 60% of 
land-based biodiversity loss, 33% of soil degradation, 
and 61% of commercial fish stock depletion5 (see box 
“Seafood”). More than 40% of insect species are now 
threatened with extinction.6 This is a huge problem given 
that three out of four fruit or seed crops used for human 
food depend, at least in part, on insect pollinators.
Chemical pesticides, herbicides, and fertilizers used in crop 
production come with significant health and environmental 
concerns. The safety of the most widely used herbicide, 
an organophosphate compound called glyphosate, is hotly 
debated; it is known to disrupt some amino acid production 
pathways in the lab, and may be linked to conditions 
including Alzheimer’s and cancer.7 There are also concerns 
surrounding the intensive use of antibiotics in livestock  
and aquaculture: nearly three-quarters of all antimicrobials 
sold globally are used in animals raised for food, and this 
has been linked to a rise in antimicrobial-resistant infections 
in animals, fish, and people.8
The future of our food security may sound rather bleak. 
But some positive stories suggest that if we radically 
rethink our food systems and consumption patterns  
across the globe, this could enable us to produce sufficient 
nutritious food to meet the growing population demand, 
while minimizing the environmental impacts. This would 
achieve greater levels of human health, well-being, 
dignity, and livelihoods – rather than the opposite.
Rethinking food systems
In response to all these global issues with food security, 
the research community and policymakers have been 
encouraged to rethink the food problem more broadly 
than just zeroing in on agricultural production. The issues 
are more than just being able to grow enough food: 
they’re about getting the right food to the right places, 
making sure that food is serving public health, changing 
consumption patterns towards more nutritious choices, 
and ensuring the ecological and social sustainability and 
resilience of food systems.
Although the concept of a broad “food system” has 
been in the making since the 1960s, a more holistic 
understanding of food has really gained traction among 
both scholars and policymakers only in the past few 
years. In 2017, for example, the Food and Agriculture 
Organization's (FAO) High Level Panel of Experts on 
Food Security and Nutrition produced a report that 
marked a fundamental shift: it called on scientists to 
study all aspects relating to “the production, processing, 
distribution, preparation and consumption of food, and 
the output of these activities, including environmental 
outcomes”. 9 Scientists and stakeholders are now teaming 
up to co-generate knowledge needed to address the 
water-energy-food nexus.10
This holistic approach makes sense for developing 
system solutions.
In India, for example, a complex interplay of subsidies, 
renewable energy, and food production has caused  
a water crisis. In the face of a booming population,  
the Indian government subsidizes the cost of electricity  
for pumping water for agriculture; solar energy-based 
water pumps have also become extremely popular.  
The country’s expansion of irrigated agriculture may  
have resulted in increased carbon sequestration,  
which could help to mitigate future climate warming.11  
But there is a lack of financial incentives or advanced 
irrigation technologies for farmers to use this water 
wisely, or to conserve it. As a result, groundwater 
use has increased 500% over 50 years.5 Fortunately, 
new management policies that restrict electricity use 
for irrigation have started to replenish the aquifers in 
western and southern parts of India.12
Another example of the necessity of holistic thinking 
comes from hydropower. Globally, thousands of dams 
have been constructed in the pursuit of renewable 
hydropower, while managing water for irrigation and 
flood prevention. But this can also disrupt hydrological 
cycles and redistribute water resources in politically 
contentious ways. A recent study of the boom of large-
scale dams in the Mekong River Basin, for example, 
showed that major fluctuations have been caused 
in the flow of river tributaries, “severely damaging 
downstream crops, livestock, fishery, and livelihoods”.13
WE  W I L L  n E E D 
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Flooding and water damage in the Park and Tongue River Watersheds located 
in Cavalier, Pembina and Cavalier Counties in North Dakota on May 23, 2013.
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Eating meat
From a planetary health perspective, it’s clear that  
a more plant-based diet would be better than current 
diets, particularly in Western contexts. The recent 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)  
land-use report14 emphasized that reducing meat and 
animal-sourced food consumption around the world 
could reduce greenhouse gas emissions significantly, 
while freeing up land for growing fruit and vegetables,  
or for other uses like ecosystem restoration. The IPCC 
report showed that 58% of all current greenhouse  
gas emissions from the food system come from  
animal-sourced foods, of which 85% is from beef  
and lamb. Using global average data, it was shown  
that an extreme scenario of removing animal-sourced 
foods from human diets by 2050 could avoid about  
8 gigatons (Gt) of greenhouse gas emissions per year. 
Limiting consumption of meat or seafood to once  
a month accomplishes about three-quarters of that goal.
Reducing meat consumption would also have huge 
ecosystem implications. Since 1970, about 20% of 
Brazil’s Amazon has been deforested – mainly to make 
room for cattle ranching and the production of soya, 
80% of which is used for animal feed (mainly for pigs). 
Reducing meat consumption would also help to liberate 
more food overall: it can take up to 9 kg of grains to 
produce 1 kg of meat. Many efficiencies can be gained  
by not feeding human food to animals. At the same 
time, some animals can process vegetation that humans 
can’t digest, and some animal grazing can be beneficial  
to grassland ecosystems.
From a human nutrition perspective, animal-sourced 
foods provide high quantities of essential nutrients that 
can be easily absorbed by the body and help to prevent 
malnutrition, particularly in poor or rural communities that 
may not be able to access sufficient nutrients elsewhere. 
Some nutrients, such as B12, are not available through 
plant sources and therefore must be consumed through 
animal products. Nevertheless, excessive quantities  
of animal-sourced foods can also contribute to 
cardiovascular disease and some types of cancer.15
There are ethical issues too, regarding who deserves  
to eat a high-meat diet. Right now, meat, milk, and eggs 
(along with oils and sugars) make up about 29% of 
calories in developing countries, but 48% in industrialized 
nations.5 Rapidly developing nations like China and Brazil 
have seen their per capita meat consumption double 
or triple since 1990, while in the United States and EU, 
meat consumption has held relatively steady. If the global 
consumption of meat is to be reduced, whose diet should 
it come from?
There is no clear single diet that is best for people  
and the planet. It remains controversial. For example, 
in February 2019, a report was published in the medical 
journal The Lancet, in conjunction with EAT Forum,  
a nongovernmental advocacy group based in Norway, 
aiming to develop a healthy, sustainable food system. 
The 46-page report16 described a “planetary health 
diet” high in plants and whole grains and low in animal 
products and processed foods. This diet would require  
the global consumption of red meat and sugar to halve, 
S E a F O O D
Fish and seafood currently make up about 20% of the animal 
protein consumed around the globe, and this figure continues 
to rise. The increase in fish consumption from the 1960s  
to the 2010s was about 3% per year – slightly more than  
the increase in meat consumption from land-based animals.21
More and more of this seafood comes from aquaculture 
rather than wild stocks. In the 1960s, aquaculture was  
a very small proportion of the 50 million tons of seafood 
consumed. By 2015, it made up more than half of the  
170 million tons consumed.21
Aquaculture comes with its own host of environmental 
concerns, from excessive nutrients or antibiotics in the 
water to the spread of diseases like lice to wild stocks.  
At the same time, wild stocks are facing big pressures. 
From 1975–2015, the percentage of stocks that are 
overfished climbed from about 10% to more than 30%.21 
Climate change and a warming ocean are pushing wild  
stocks away from their traditionally fished grounds – this 
could have huge impacts, particularly in the South Pacific, 
where tuna are moving out of the island nations’ coastal  
(and economically controlled) waters.
Efforts like the Marine Stewardship Council are working 
hard to make fishing more sustainable and innovative 
schemes have arisen to make aquaculture smarter.22 
Shellfish can be farmed alongside fin fish, for example,  
in order to soak up excess nutrients, and kelp can be 
grown to help lower the acidity of local waters, which can 
be beneficial to shellfish farms. Such projects both have 
environmental benefits and can make huge contributions  
to diets by diversifying sources of fatty acids.
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and the global consumption of nuts, fruits, vegetables, 
and legumes to double. Such consumption could 
improve public health, although it would require 
substantial and perhaps sometimes unrealistic changes  
to current dietary patterns.
Although the EAT plan received widespread attention 
and support, it was also criticized by animal agriculture 
lobbyists, international organizations, and members of 
the scientific community. Some warned that a planetary-
wide switch to such a diet could lead to the loss of 
millions of jobs linked to animal husbandry and destroy 
some traditional diets. Furthermore, a recent analysis 
showed that this diet was in fact unaffordable for nearly  
2 billion people.17 There is a clear and urgent need  
to better understand the trade-offs among nutrition, 
social, environmental, and economic outcomes of  
our food system.
Spotlight on solutions
Several innovative programmes, innovations, and policies 
have arisen in recent years that show how things can 
change. For instance, farmers across Europe are subject 
to so-called greening rules. Under this system, 30% of 
payments given to farmers is linked to three practices: 
crop diversification, maintaining permanent grassland, 
and dedicating 5% of arable land to areas beneficial to 
biodiversity, such as hedges or fallow land. In the period 
from 2007–2013, more than €7.5 billion of public funds 
helped to manage more than 13 million hectares of land 
in the United Kingdom, encouraging farming methods 
that enhance biodiversity, protect water, and improve 
soil quality.
In other parts of the world, large-scale long-term policies 
such as “Grain for Green” in China incentivize farmers 
to return sloped and marginal farmlands to their natural 
state, in an attempt to reduce soil erosion and carbon 
losses. As of 2017, approximately 28 million hectares 
of farmland and land classified as barren or degraded 
had been converted to forests, contributing to a 25% 
increase in global greenness from 2000–2017.11
A Planetary Health Plate
The EAT-Lancet report concluded that a healthy diet  
should consist of half fruits and vegetables by volume,  
with only an optional, modest amount of animal protein.  
Source: Willett et al. 2019
Approximately 30% of the food we produce  
globally ends up in the waste, according to the  
FAO. Not including greenhouse gases from land  
use, the carbon footprint of this wasted food was 
estimated by the FAO in 2013 to be 3.3 Gt of CO2 
equivalent: about 8–10% of 2018 global emissions.  
In 2013, UN Environment and the FAO launched  
a campaign called “Think Eat Save”, which provides 
toolkits and infographics to help change behaviours 
from the institutional to the individual level. In China, 
the government-endorsed “Operation Empty Plate” 
aims to restrict things such as lavish banquets and 
over-ordering in restaurants.
Others are taking innovative approaches to 
increasing protein sources that are more sustainable 
than cattle. Although insects are yet to hit 
supermarket shelves in any dramatic way outside 
Asia, the insect protein market could be worth  
US$1 billion by 2025.18 Other meat alternatives 
include crops like soya or lab-grown tissues 
(although debate continues about whether  
lab-grown meat is more sustainable).
Advances in technologies such as satellite imaging, 
drones, and sensors or microcontrollers connected 
through the internet of things (IoT), has enabled 
farmers to precisely apply water, fertilizers, pesticides, 
and insecticides in exactly the amount and time 
that they are needed. Although smart agriculture 
technologies have been around for decades,  
recent technological advances have enabled  
broader adoption. Precision agriculture has been 
shown in field studies to enrich soils19 while 
maintaining profits.20
Much effort is now going into genetic modification 
(GM) of some crops, including rice, to increase yields 
and nutrition, especially in the face of climate change. 
Uncertainty remains about the long-term ecological, 
economic, and health impacts of GM crops.
Multilateral organizations are more commonly taking 
a food-system approach, with consultation processes 
that engage different stakeholders. For instance,  
in October 2018, the FAO Committee on Agriculture 
requested that the FAO spearhead an effort to 
develop Voluntary Codes of Conduct for the reduction 
of food loss and food waste by October 2020.  
This follows in the footsteps of the highly influential 
FAO Code of Conduct for responsible fisheries, 
which was adopted in 1995.
The notion that action towards a more sustainable 
food system is urgently needed is gaining ground 
throughout the world. But opinions still vary on what 
should be changed, how it should be changed, and who 
the key agents of that change should be. No one yet 
agrees what sustainable food looks, smells, and tastes 
like, or even how we should measure the sustainability 
of food. However, the global consensus is that food is 
critical in human survival and sustainability and must 
be secured no matter how challenging it is to solve 
these pressing problems.
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what we do, and what we consider normal (see box 
“Changing mindsets about plastic”).
Another powerful change lever involves reconsidering a 
system’s goals, which is where the SDGs are extremely 
helpful. Purposeful transformations are enhanced when 
the players have a clear, shared aspiration, such as the 
ones laid out by the SDGs. There are other levers too, 
including how the system operates, that is, the rules of 
the game including who has power and how they wield 
it. For example, for many years tobacco companies 
controlled information about the harmful effects  
of smoking. It took 
action by the US 
surgeon general and, 
ultimately, many cities 
and towns, to defy the 
ubiquitous practice and 
begin banning smoking 
from public places (see 
box “Leverage Points”).
T-systems typically 
develop in stages. 
Early on, individual 
transformation initiatives 
include diverse 
stakeholders working 
on a relatively small 
scale. This early stage 
focuses on the creation 
of safe spaces or niches 
for experimentation 
with radical innovation. 
Effective niches allow 
for learning during these 
early stages without 
punishing failures.
In Germany, for 
example, the shift to 
renewables, particularly 
solar, is generally called 
Energiewende (energy 
transition). The term was 
introduced in 1980 by 
the Öko-Institut, which 
called for a full transition 
away from nuclear- and 
fossil-fuel-based energy 
sources. Energiewende 
is tackling a century-
old production model, 
with all its entrenched 
interests, with mixed 
results. In 1991, German 
law established financing that helped move windmills 
and solar panels from niche experiments to widespread 
use; later legislation proscribed a nuclear-energy-free 
future. In 2010, Germany passed a law mandating 80–
95% reductions in greenhouse gases by 2050 relative  
to 1990. This had numerous transformative ramifications. 
In 2011, for example, engineering company Siemens 
announced its complete withdrawal from the nuclear 
industry, and the top utility company E.ON claimed 
it would withdraw from both coal and nuclear power 
generation. Although some criticized Germany for 
weakening its commitments, the country generated 
54.5% of electricity from renewable energy in March 2019.
Picking up on a word coined by American futurist 
Alvin Toffler, some energy companies began to label 
households and farms with solar panels or wind turbines 
as “prosumers” – producers and consumers combined. 
Experiments in financing prosumer-produced energy 
provided investment security for renewable energy that 
made it possible for many more households to adopt 
this new technology, 
which in turn made 
renewable energy  
the more cost-effective 
energy form in many 
places. By 2016, a 
German report noted 
that an enormous 
transition in the 
production of energy 
had begun to happen: 
by then, some 46% 
of renewable energy 
generation was from 
various forms of citizen 
(prosumer) participation. 
The transformation  
has not been without 
issues. Some  
observers criticize  
the subsidies involved 
with Energiewende.  
And there is still 
resistance from 
Europe’s largest  
energy companies.
The case of marriage 
equality in the United 
States also highlights 
the different stages  
of transformation.  
In the late 1960s and  
the 1970s, action 
focused on gay pride 
parades and the 
promotion of gay rights. 
Later, activists aimed to 
shift the mindset around 
love and commitment, 
as well as rights for 
families, no matter  
what the gender of the 
people involved. In the 
early 2000s, T-system actors deliberately pursued policy 
changes through the courts, media, and other avenues 
that could shift the existing laws and regulations 
regarding marriage. Ultimately, Vermont instituted 
the first civil unions in the year 2000. Then in 2004 
Massachusetts became the first state to legalize same-
sex marriage. By 2015, many “nudges” later, the US 
Supreme Court ruled that all US states were required  
to recognize and allow same-sex marriages.5
When more than 150 world leaders met  
in 2015 to develop the United Nations 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development, their 
key phrase was “transforming our world”. 
The 17 Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) they agreed upon represent nothing 
less than a “shared blueprint for peace and 
prosperity” for the world: an unprecedented 
agenda to end extreme poverty, fight 
inequality, and protect the environment, 
among other significant goals.
The SDGs mark a departure from previous attempts  
to influence how humanity responds to modern 
challenges. In the face of rapid environmental shifts  
like climate change, the rallying cry has mostly been 
about “adaptation and resilience” – the important tasks  
of altering our societies to be able to bear the brunt  
of changing conditions and adapt to cope with them. 
What is emerging now is a realization that adaptation 
simply isn’t enough; humans don’t want just to survive  
in the face of rapid change, but to thrive. Doing that 
means transforming societies altogether.
The term transformation has become a common 
catchphrase in international media and policy circles. 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s 
special report on limiting warming to 1.5°C1 mentions 
“transformation” more than 300 times – that’s almost 
every other page of the report. The 2018 “Living Planet 
Report”2 from the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) argues that 
we are “on the cusp of a truly historic transformation”.
So, what does transformation really mean? It can be 
defined as “profound and enduring nonlinear systemic 
changes, typically involving social, cultural, technological, 
political, economic, and/or environmental processes”. 3 
In other words, the world as we know it changes in 
a big way. Importantly, transformative change goes 
well beyond incrementalism or reform, both of which 
allow existing practices, goals, and structures to stay 
in place. Transformation, in contrast, involves change in 
fundamental norms or assumptions. Unlike a “transition”, 
which implies moving from one place or state to another, 
“transformation” is more about completely reinventing 
shape or form – like the metamorphosis of a caterpillar  
to a butterfly.
Sometimes transformations are unintentional – like 
climate change, or the ongoing extinction of up to a million 
species. Some technologies or societal changes – like the 
development of artificial intelligence – are likely to prompt 
transformational change, but no one is in the driver’s seat 
deciding what that transformation should look like, or what 
its goals should be. Other transformations have been 
purposeful, like the ending of apartheid in South Africa  
and the fight to allow marriage across all genders.
The SDGs require purposeful transformation. We need 
to rethink how we design economies and do business; 
how we produce and distribute the food we eat – even 
what we eat; how we design and construct our homes, 
workplaces, and communities; and how we get from 
place to place. Importantly, we need to transform 
how we humans relate to each other and to nature. 
Transformation needs to bring human enterprise of all 
sorts back into alignment with the realities of what this 
planet can sustain.
Purposeful transformation is hard. The innate complexity 
of the world means that the course of a transformation 
cannot be entirely planned or driven; there are always 
unexpected events. System transformations are fraught, 
with multiple actors and multiple leverage points  
for change. Actions in one part of the system ripple, 
creating unintended side effects. The proverbial “tipping 
point” of change is much talked about, but very hard to 
determine in advance, and even, sometimes, in hindsight. 
Importantly, transformations literally break down existing 
systems in the process of creating new ones; the hard 
reality is that there is stubborn resistance by people 
unwilling to relinquish the comfortable and familiar.
The goal is finding a critical mass of change-makers 
to move a system forward in a variety of ways, while 
including all relevant voices in the process. Instead of 
rational and linear planning, these change agents have 
to “nudge” things in the right direction, recognizing 
the inherent complexity of the system and the 
transformation process. That is why a set of aspirations 
like the ones embedded in the SDGs is so important:  
it provides a guiding framework that helps keep change-
makers moving in similar directions even while they are 
taking independent actions. How can change-makers 
orchestrate that, or help to guide the process?
The name of the game
This is where Transformations-systems (T-systems) 
come in. A T-system comprises all those initiatives 
nudging a status quo system – anything from an issue 
like healthcare to a geographic area like a watershed –  
in a similar transformational direction. These efforts  
may operate alongside a status quo system, such as 
the zero-carbon energy subsidiary of a traditional energy 
company. But T-systems are focused on change and 
innovation, compared with the status quo’s emphasis 
on production and administration. They require their 
own distinctive identity, skills, and organizing space 
to operate. Smooth transformations have many 
connections between the two systems.
There has been little recognition or study of T-systems –  
it is a new field. That means that many transformational 
efforts simply muddle along without coherence  
or guidance, with fragmented efforts going in  
different directions.
One task of those studying T-systems is to identify 
productive ways to support intentional transformation. 
Pioneering environmentalist and lead author of the 
pathbreaking book The Limits to Growth Donella 
Meadows identified some key leverage points or  
“places to intervene in a system”. 4 Meadows argued  
that the most powerful leverage point is the power  
to transcend paradigms or mindsets – the narratives  
we tell ourselves about who we are, why we do 
Solar panels have become common on residential  
homes in Germany.
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Four strategies
T-systems include four distinct strategies.6 A key part  
of transformation is shaking up the status quo with  
a “warrior” strategy. Activist organizations like Extinction 
Rebellion (XR) disrupt and destabilize the current 
system, to create windows of opportunity for radical 
alternatives to become established and flourish. XR, 
founded by a group of academics in the United Kingdom 
in 2018, is attempting to reframe the debate on climate 
heating by declaring boldly “This is an Emergency!”.  
XR draws its inspiration from past transformation 
efforts like those of Mahatma Gandhi and the Indian 
Independence Movement. 
In 2019, British newspaper The Guardian reported  
that significant progress had been made on XR’s  
three demands of telling the truth, zero emissions  
by 2026, and a citizens’ assembly.7 On telling the truth,  
for example, XR has influenced multiple British politicians 
to acknowledge that climate heating is the biggest 
challenge facing humanity. On zero emissions, XR has 
persuaded the UK’s Committee on Climate Change  
to announce revised emissions targets, including a 
UK commitment to reach net-zero emissions by 2050, 
compared with the formerly agreed target of 80% 
reductions by that time. XR has (at the time of  
writing) been less successful on its third demand  
of having the government create a citizens’ assembly;  
but it is early days.
A second strategy, a “lover” strategy, is associated 
with multi-stakeholder processes such as the Forest 
Stewardship Council (FSC). FSC is a global nonprofit 
oriented towards promoting responsible management 
of the world’s forests, founded in 1993. Like many 
transformation efforts, it brings together unusual 
partners: in this case environmentalists, social activists, 
and businesses. Recognizing the power of markets 
in today’s economies, FSC developed a new set of 
certification standards for managing forests responsibly. 
FSC ultimately gained the support of key environmental 
groups like the WWF, the Sierra Club, Greenpeace,  
the Natural Resources Defense Council, and the 
National Wildlife Federation, which pressured forestry 
companies into alignment with its standards. FSC  
used its certification and labelling approach to create  
a competitive environment in which companies had  
a new reputational incentive to gain a label certifying 
them as eco-friendly. The results are impressive:  
some 380 million acres of forest are now certified 
globally by FSC, with more than 2,500 companies 
certified in the United States.
The “entrepreneurial” strategy aims to create small, 
niche examples of the transformed future. This strategy 
has been used by organic farmers, alternative schools, 
farm-to-table restaurants, local currencies, and more. 
They typically face a challenge moving out of their 
niche status.
The fourth, “missionary”, strategy is represented by 
people in status quo organizations who are determined  
to transform them. Paul Polman, CEO at Unilever 
(2009–2019), was an archetypical example. He undertook 
a wide variety of actions to push the company and its 
production processes in a transformation direction, 
such as co-founding the sustainable seafood initiative 
the Marine Stewardship Council, changing company 
performance metrics to include measures of sustainability, 
rejecting quarterly report filings in order to focus on  
long-term goals, and buying entrepreneur companies 
like Ben & Jerry’s ice cream that focus on community 
building and sustainability.
All of these strategies interact in a T-System such as the 
Wellbeing Economy Alliance (WEAll). Formally launched 
in 2018, WEAll targets the major underlying concepts 
behind today’s dominant economic systems: that endless 
economic growth is always good, indeed necessary; 
that businesses have the core purpose of maximizing 
shareholder wealth; and that markets are “free”, with 
a so-called invisible hand that will correct all problems. 
WEAll is helping to shift this mindset, by connecting 
and aligning many initiatives already working towards 
the same ends and rewriting the narrative of how  
we define a healthy economy. It aims to shift the  
rules of the game, the practices of business, and the 
metrics by which nations judge economic success. 
WEAll and its affiliates’ alternative approach emphasizes 
what ecologist Hunter Lovins, one of the founders,  
calls an economy in service to life: one that provides 
dignity and well-being for all, including non-human beings.
C H a n G I n G  M I n D S E T S  
a B O U T  P L a S T I C 
Plastics became wildly popular in the years 
following the Second World War and were 
touted as a utopian replacement for natural 
materials like steel, wood, glass, and paper. 
The famous line from the 1967 Dustin 
Hoffman movie The Graduate captured what 
proponents thought at that time: “Plastics. …
There’s a great future in plastics.” The image  
quickly paled, however (as Hoffman’s 
character recognized). Plastics soon took on 
an image of cheap, mass production. As early 
as the 1960s, plastic debris was discovered 
in the ocean. Today, of the 300 million tons 
produced annually, the vast majority ends  
up in landfills or waterways.
The continued business verve for plastics, 
thanks to its cheap price tag and flexible 
structure, has led to a boom in single-use 
plastics: things like disposable forks and 
spoons, plates, plastic bags and wrap,  
and drinks containers, particularly water 
bottles. One estimate is that about 500 billion 
plastic bags are produced annually – with an 
average “working life” of about 15 minutes 
each. More than 100 billion plastic beverage 
bottles were sold in the US alone in 2014 – 
about 315 bottles per person.
A mindset of broad awareness of the 
problems created by plastic waste is just now 
beginning to develop: Google Trends shows 
that searches for “single use plastic” have 
been climbing since 2017. The United Nations 
reported in 2018 that some 27 countries had 
enacted some forms of bans on single-use 
plastics. In June 2019, Vermont became 
the first US state to ban everything from 
straws to retail bags (to be in effect by 2020). 
Similarly, Canada announced a plan to ban 
such plastics nationally by 2021. The seeds  
for transformation have been planted.
T r a n S F O r MaT I O n 
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Simple steps
People often find transformation and large-systems-
change work overwhelming. But it can be broken down 
into three manageable steps.
First, it is vital to really see the system undergoing 
transformation, often by mapping it. Seeing and mapping 
can be supported by technical means, such as data 
visualization, and more qualitative and soft techniques that 
bring stakeholders together. The next step is to connect 
those actors, many of whom may have different strategies 
and interests, into a powerful system that can identify 
radical actions and experiments to achieve their goal.  
The third step involves implementation of these actions – 
although the three steps are cyclical and interact.
In order for a T-system to be effective, stewards are 
needed to guide them through these steps. The Southern 
Africa Food Lab (SAFL), founded in 2009, is playing this 
“steward” role in developing a local T-system to address 
the problem of hunger. The Lab has analysed the  
local players in food systems from farmers to retailers, 
brought them together, and spurred actions such as 
encouraging food chains to diversify their purchasing 
networks to include small-hold farmers.
The lack of formal structure in T-systems can make 
them vulnerable and ephemeral. But it also makes 
them nimble: they have a loose and light institutional 
infrastructure. In contrast, the status quo system tends  
to resist change. Rapid transformation is resisted  
by attitudes like “but we’ve always done it this way”,  
the benefits and power people receive from traditional 
ways of doing things, and existing infrastructure, 
bureaucracy, or processes. That is why transformational 
efforts often start in protected niches as a way of 
establishing their worth before tackling the broader 
institutional landscape or regime.
Purposefully transforming our societies is difficult, 
complex, and messy by its very nature. There is no 
cookbook approach or simple solution. Experimentation 
and failure are part of the process. But history provides 
evidence that it is possible to purposefully change deep-
seated structures, mindsets, assumptions, and operating 
practices. Intentionally recognizing and understanding 
various actors as part of a T-system can help to promote 
this kind of change.
L E V E r a G E  P O I n T S  
O F  T r a n S F O r M a T I O n
Power relations – Who 
needs to participate?
For example, take power out of the 
hands of a top-down, centralized 
elite, and distribute it among  
all important stakeholders.
Perspectives – What is 
the desired mindset?
For example, transform thoughts  
of “this can be thrown away”  
to “waste is a problem”.
Purposes – What are we 
trying to achieve?
For example, shift from “How can  
I make a more efficient car engine?” 
to “How can fossil-fuel use  
be eliminated from transport?”
Performance metrics – 
How should we measure 
and reward progress?
For example, transform the  
metric of national progress from 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)  
to a well-being index like the 
Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI).
Practices, policies, and 
processes – How should 
the system operate?
For example, transform the 
production of goods from a system 
that churns out cheap products  
for high-volume sales to one that 
leases more durable products.
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We live in times of exponential 
technological change. In the last year, 
scientists 3D-printed a prototype heart. 
A tiny, swallowable device can capture 
cellular-level images of the gut without 
anaesthesia. And, rather than just obey 
simple commands, artificial intelligence 
(AI) assistants like Siri can perform 
conversation-based tasks like scheduling  
an appointment. But this is all the tip  
of the iceberg.
Massive amounts of 
data, new computational 
abilities, and AI methods 
such as machine learning 
are together spurring 
disruptive progress: 
technical systems are 
becoming as good 
(or even better) than 
humans at recognizing 
faces and voices, 
diagnosing cancer, 
translating languages, 
and producing news 
articles, music, and 
paintings. In 2019 an  
AI system even wrote 
a scientific book: a 250-
page summary of more 
than 1,000 research 
papers on lithium-ion 
batteries. Big data 
analysis and algorithms 
are allowing for 
autonomous driving and 
self-repairing machine 
lines in factories. In October 2019 a Google research 
team announced1 that its quantum computer was the 
first to perform a calculation (in less than three minutes) 
that would be infeasible for a classical supercomputer, 
which would need 10,000 years to complete it. Quantum 
computing will revolutionize AI as ever-more data can be 
analysed in ever-less time.
Yet, in the midst of all these technological disruptions,  
we are still not harnessing humanity’s capacity for 
innovation to save the planet and to create just and fair 
societies. Instead, these technological changes have largely 
been used to increase consumption, economic growth, 
and resource extraction, putting further strain on our planet, 
generating negative consequences for vulnerable people, 
and escalating socio-economic inequalities.
Looking back, it is astonishing that in 2015, when  
the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement emerged, 
digital breakthroughs were largely being ignored as 
a useful tool by sustainability communities (the only 
mention of “digital” in the 35-page, 2030 Agenda refers 
to the “digital divide” between people who do, and don’t, 
have access to information technologies). The digital 
pioneers and supporters of sustainability transformations 
are still not cooperating enough; not learning from each 
other systematically; not reflecting how to harness future 
innovation cycles to create a more sustainable planet;  
not developing joint concepts for a sustainable 
digital future. While there is a substantive global 
debate about the ethical dimensions of AI, there are 
fewer conversations 
about deploying 
these intelligent 
systems for human-
centred, sustainable 
development.2 
Digitalization and 
sustainability seem  
to be passing ships 
in the night. This has 
resulted in many 
missed opportunities.
Implementing the 2030 
Agenda for sustainable 
development and the 
Paris Agreement for 
curbing climate change 
will require fundamental 
transformations in 
our societies and 
economies (see chapter 
“Transformation”). 
We know that climate-
warming emissions 
must peak in 2020 and 
decrease by half each 
subsequent decade towards net zero by mid-century 
(see chapter “Climate”). But we are not at all on track 
to make that happen.3 The Digital Revolution can and 
should be harnessed to help.
The revolutions
Human history has undergone a few major civilizational 
transformations. In the Neolithic Revolution, starting 
about 11,000 years ago, humans developed agriculture; 
the Industrial Revolution, starting just 200 years ago, 
developed fossil fuels and machinery. The Digital 
Revolution is upon us now.
These developments have allowed for explosions in 
human capabilities: innovation has allowed us to leave 
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our planet and reach the moon, develop systems of 
art and architecture, create complex social systems – 
global trade, democracies, the United Nations – and 
reach new levels of understanding about our universe. 
Since 1900, the human population increased more than 
fourfold, life expectancy at birth has more than doubled, 
and the number of people living in extreme poverty 
has declined.4 But all this comes at a price: ever-greater 
pressure on planetary support systems, and huge socio-
economic and power-related inequalities.
At the beginning of the 21st century, researchers started  
to identify a “Great Acceleration” of human activities  
and wealth creation:5 population, economic activity, fertilizer 
use, water use, energy production, paper production,  
the emission of carbon dioxide, and more, have all 
exploded in recent decades (see chapter “Introduction”). 
This started after 1945 for countries within the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
and expanded in the 1990s to emerging economies like 
China, India, and Brazil. This has driven the earth system 
towards “tipping points”6: points beyond which a tiny 
change in one variable, like CO2, could result in large, 
possibly catastrophic change to earth systems that 
support human life. At the same time, social stressors 
have eroded social cohesion, resulting in nationalism  
and authoritarian backlashes (see chapter “Populism”).
In the past few decades, innovations have allowed  
some human impacts on our planet to decline on a 
per capita basis.4 The amount of land needed to grow 
food per person, for example, has halved thanks to 
improvements in agriculture over the past 50 years.  
Per capita water consumption peaked around 1980  
and has since gone down slightly. Global consumption 
of wood has levelled off. Yet greenhouse gas emissions 
continue to climb, and as most things become cheaper 
and more efficient (like computing and transport), 
humanity often responds by using ever more of it, 
resulting in an overall increase in consumption of 
resources. An overwhelming mountain of studies 
demonstrates that growth in population, production,  
and consumption continues to threaten the stability  
of many critical ecosystems and social structures.7 
Today we are at the start of a new wave of the 
Digital Revolution, driven by machine learning and 
autonomous technical systems, that is pervading all 
aspects of society and has the potential for enormous 
repercussions. Since the 1940s, computing speed has 
increased by a factor of more than 10 billion. Artificial 
general intelligence (AGI) – defined as a technical system 
able to accomplish any cognitive task at least as well 
as humans – has long been seen as only a pipe dream. 
But there is now a rising expectation that AGI could be 
achieved within the 21st century.8
AI-driven systems are already doing more and more  
of the world’s work: making more and more decisions 
about who gets financial credit, access to health 
insurance, or employment; influencing who police 
officers target on patrol 
or how long prison times 
might be; and shaping 
investment decisions.  
AI and machine 
learning are triggering 
fundamental ethical 
questions about how  
and when machines  
can and should  
replace or support 
human decisions.9
Digital innovation now 
has the capacity to 
dramatically transform 
everything from  
labour markets to  
our understanding  
of planetary systems, 
from democracies to 
our view of cognition – 
and our understanding 
of human beings. This 
deep change will spur 
systemic uncertainty, 
making governance 
efforts challenging.10,11,12 
Investigating, 
understanding, and 
anticipating digital 
futures, disruptions,  
and trends during  
the next 1–3 decades 
in order to develop 
sustainable digital pathways will be a major task.
Digital potentials for good
Technological change is a source of many pressures 
on the planetary systems and our societies, but also 
presents possible solutions.10,11,13 Artificial intelligence, 
machine learning, digital platforms, the internet of things 
(IoT), robotics, 3D printing, big data analysis, virtual 
monitoring systems, and blockchain – all can be used 
to incentivize sustainable behaviour, spark resource and 
energy efficiencies, and generate circular economies 
that close the loop of production, recycling, and reuse  
of materials. They could be put to work to create a zero-
emission future, and to more effectively monitor, protect 
global ecosystems, and enhance human capabilities.
We have the power to create new societal and economic 
realities with the click of a button.
While there is no consensus on quantitative estimates, 
a recent report suggested that the digital sector has 
the potential to directly reduce fossil fuel emissions by 
15% by 2030; changes to consumer habits and business 
models might spur a further 35% reduction.14 In the 
energy systems, digitization can help by modelling 
factors including demand, generation, transmission,  
and costs – critical steps in integrating decentralized, 
variable energy sources like wind or solar into a reliable 
grid. Digitization will also help to get electricity to remote 
rural areas in developing 
countries: the University 
of California, Berkeley, 
and the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology 
are developing models 
that help to determine 
the best way to 
electrify remote areas 
in countries like India 
or Rwanda, similar 
to the World Bank’s 
Electrification Pathways 
web-based application.
Some of the greatest 
potentials for improving 
energy efficiency and 
reducing emissions 
lie in using digital 
technologies to control 
end-use systems like 
buildings, transport,  
and industry.15  
According to a report  
by the American Council 
for an Energy-Efficient 
Economy, for example, 
the use of occupancy 
sensors, smart 
thermostats, and lighting 
controls reduces energy 
use in offices on average 
by 18%. When Google 
trialled an AI-based 
system to control the cooling of one of its data centres 
in 2016, it reduced its energy use by 40%. In Colombia, 
smart public transport transit cards increased the use 
of public transport by 56% in one year. The Digital 
Revolution could spur more efficient food systems, 
by reducing food waste and improving agricultural 
productivity (see chapter “Food”).
The massive increase in images of our planet –  
both from cheap on-the-ground cameras and high-
resolution images from space – has helped to disclose  
to the world what once went unnoticed. For example,  
Global Forest Watch is an open-source web application 
that uses satellite data to monitor forests in real time, 
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As new passenger car sales rise globally, the percentage with 
some degree of automation is projected to rise dramatically.
Source: Ptolemus Group, 2017
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letting anyone in the world (from journalists to decision 
makers) track deforestation or illegal forest activity.
Microsoft’s AI for Earth provides open-source digital 
tools and grants to help people use technology to 
solve global environmental challenges, from identifying 
suspicious marine traffic that might be engaged in  
illegal fishing, to applying AI to soil data to make farming 
more sustainable.
Deeper change needed
Exponential technological changes could lead to 
a decoupling of wealth creation from pressure on 
ecosystems, which is good for the planet. But they do not 
automatically translate into sustainability transformations 
if they are not coupled with societal innovations.16  
Four major building blocks are fundamental to this  
shift towards sustainable digital futures.
First, public institutions need to play a role in shaping  
and governing digitalization towards sustainability. 
Today, the public administrations of most countries  
have negligible knowledge about digital change  
and its importance for societal and sustainable 
development.17 The state cannot govern what it  
does not know. In the 1960s and 1970s, large-scale 
public sector modernization schemes took place  
in many OECD countries to make public institutions  
more knowledgeable in fields like economics,  
social protection, and environmental issues. The same 
is now needed for the field of digitalization. Finland is 
leading the way here, with comprehensive efforts on 
things such as open government, e-based education, 
and protection of privacy.
Second, sustainability needs to be put at the heart of the 
work of the digital pioneers, from research institutions 
like the Fraunhofer Society or MIT, to companies like 
Google or Amazon. For now, producers of algorithms,  
big data specialists, and machine learning experts 
are shaping the future of our technical systems and 
infrastructures, but do not necessarily consider 
sustainability challenges as relevant for their work, 
or appreciate the urgency of addressing sustainability 
problems. Much as the isolated fields of earth science 
and social science were melded to form sustainability 
science during the last decades, it is now time to form  
a unified field of digital sustainability.
One way to achieve this is for digital pioneers  
and sustainability research communities, along  
with government bodies, to formulate a new  
mission statement comparable to a moon mission:  
an international “Zero Carbon Missions in the Digital 
Age” or “2030 Agenda Missions in the Digital Age” 
could help to focus technological revolutions on  
solving most pressing societal needs.18 For now, 
projects like UNEP’s Sustainable Digital Finance 
Alliance, or the FAO’s Climate-Smart Agriculture 
Sourcebook, are all too small in investment and scope. 
The European Commission has created five missions 
as part of Horizon Europe, its post-2020 research and 
innovation programme; climate change and leveraging 
digitalization for the public good are two key cross-
cutting themes.
Third, market forces should be mobilized by getting 
the prices right. For now, in most countries labour 
is taxed significantly, but resources and greenhouse 
gas emissions are not. As a result, innovation is still 
targeted at substituting labour rather than reducing 
emissions and resource consumption. Carbon pricing 
and comprehensive ecological tax reforms would 
incentivize the mobilization of digital change in  
support of sustainable solutions.19 Sustainability-
oriented tax systems could mobilize the search  
for profit and traditional mechanisms of capitalism  
to drive sustainable action.
Fourth, social communication systems and other 
information and knowledge dissemination systems need 
to be harnessed to encourage sustainability thinking  
and actions (see chapter “Media”). Digital innovations 
are based on infrastructures like “information highways”, 
but sustainability in the digital age will require 
comprehensive literacy programmes to teach people 
how best to learn from new digital information systems 
and how to use digital tools. Our education systems 
need to be updated.
Avoiding risk
At the same time that digital technologies are harnessed 
to embrace sustainability, societies also need to avoid 
digitally driven systemic risks: large-scale changes that 
could trigger societal destabilization.10
Most previous technological revolutions came with 
huge turmoil, conflict, and war before societies adapted 
to their new conditions;20 the combination of deep 
transformational change in both sustainability and 
digitalization has the power to cause huge disruption. 
Mediating this will require understanding the risks, 
developing preventative strategies, and planning 
safety nets for those negatively affected. The AI Now 
Institute at New York University, United States, is one 
interdisciplinary research centre working hard on this, 
primarily by considering the societal implications of 
artificial intelligence. The German Advisory Council on 
Global Change (WBGU), supported by major science 
organizations like Future Earth and the International 
Science Council, announced a charter for “Our Common 
Digital Future”. 21 This should help to trigger debate about 
a global action agenda to align sustainability and digital 
transformations, along with ethical guardrails for the 
digital age.
One risk of digital change, for example, is large-
scale disruption of labour markets by comprehensive 
automatization. Systems like autonomous vehicles  
have the potential to put drivers out of work;  
Worldwide Supply Of Industrial Robots
Technology continues to replace various aspects of human 
labour. Source: International Federation of Robotics, 2019
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artificial intelligence could replace the skillsets of 
traditionally high-level workers like doctors, tax experts, 
and lawyers. Similarly, digitalization can lead to 
disempowerment of individuals. People’s privacy and 
citizens’ rights may be threatened by comprehensive 
digital surveillance and social scoring systems.  
Moreover, digitalization could undermine democracy 
by enhancing the power of authoritarian states or of 
uncontrolled private businesses22 (see chapter “Media”).
Importantly, digitization could also, as have all  
other technological innovations of the last centuries,  
spur unsustainable growth and consumption patterns 
that trigger tipping points in the earth system. 
Increasing cheap access to information, for example, 
could spur a boom in electricity demand and create 
further greenhouse gas emissions (see box “Greening 
the data ecosystem”).
Others worry about uncontrolled human enhancement 
or artificial evolution methods that will lead to large-
scale transformation of humanity. The first stage of 
the Anthropocene saw humans having unprecedented 
impacts on this planet; the next stage may see  
humans having unprecedented impacts on themselves. 
University of Washington computer scientist Pedro 
Domingos has said this all may lead to the evolution  
of a new species, Homo technicus, along with  
a biosphere “as different from today’s as today’s  
is from the primordial ocean”.23
For every dystopic vision of the future, there exists 
also a different scenario, in which the Digital Revolution 
enables people to build transnational communities  
and create global cooperative cultures that tread lightly  
on the earth.
Ideally, the Digital Revolution will consist of three 
dynamics: one that supports a new field of digital 
sustainability and depresses social and ecological 
disruption; a second that builds a “new humanism” 
of enlightenment and awareness, while depressing 
totalitarianism; and a third that strengthens an ethical 
human-machine collaboration, while depressing 
abuse of new technologies.10 AI and machine learning 
could enable human self-realization, enhance human 
agency, increase societal capabilities, empathy, and 
other social skills, and cultivate societal cohesion – 
instead of devaluating human skills, removing human 
responsibilities, reducing human control over technical 
systems, or eroding human self-determination.
Either way, new horizons of human development and 
human civilization are clearly emerging. The key challenge 
for the international community – researchers and society 
alike – is to develop a common vision for human-centred, 
sustainable development in the digital era. A lot of work 
lies ahead.
G r E E n I n G  T H E  
D a T a  E C O S Y S T E M
As the digital world gets ever-more prolific, 
concerns have exploded in the media about  
the potentially skyrocketing energy use of the 
digital sector. Those concerns are well founded,  
but there is plenty of reason for optimism that  
the digital revolution can be green.
Between 2010 and 2015, global data traffic 
quadrupled and the number of mobile subscribers 
increased by 30%. But, at the same time, 
emissions and electricity use by the digital industry –  
including everything from phones to data centres 
and televisions – declined by about 15%.14  
That’s mainly thanks to dramatic increases  
in digital energy efficiency: users are switching  
to more energy-efficient handheld devices,  
for example, and the rising demand for cloud 
computing is largely being met by uber-efficient 
hyper-scale datacentres. But efficiency gains 
cannot keep up such a rapid pace forever.
Usage is also going up, thanks to unlimited services 
like Netflix, and the internet of things, which may 
soon see billions of household and community 
objects digitally connected. This makes it hard  
to forecast the energy use of the digital industry 
in the long term. In 2015 the information 
communication technology (ICT) industry  
globally was responsible for 3.6% of electricity  
use (and 1.4% of greenhouse gas emissions).14  
One controversial, much-publicized forecast  
from 2018 predicted that the digital industry  
could consume more than 20% of the world’s 
electricity by 2030.24
The key to preventing a boom in greenhouse  
gas emissions is to push for the digital industry  
to switch to renewables. Many companies,  
such as Google, Apple, and Microsoft, have already 
made commitments to low-carbon operations. 
Google’s data centre in Hamina, Finland, for 
example, uses naturally cold water from the Baltic 
Sea to cool its servers, and wind energy to drive 
operations. The digital industry can be a major 
driver of renewables – of all the corporate contracts 
signed to provide renewable energy in 2015,  
two-thirds were from ICT companies.25 But much 
more remains to be done. In Northern Virginia,  
one of the highest concentrations of data centres  
in the world continues to get more than 95%  
of its power from fossil fuels.26 
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